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Abstract 
Private equity, characterized by firms operating as privately held 
partnerships  organizing  the  acquisition  and  ‘taking  private’  of 
public companies, is currently dominating the business news due 
to  deals  growing  rapidly  in  number  and  size.    If  the  trend 
continues unabated, the 1989 prediction by economist Michael 
Jensen of ‘the eclipse of the public corporation’ could be proved 
accurate soon.  This paper argues matters will work out much 
differently, with private equity being at least partially eclipsed.  
One possibility is that current market and legal conditions, which 
are highly congenial to public-to-private transactions, could be 
disrupted in ways that cause the private equity surge to stall or 
even go into reverse.  The paper draws on history to make this 
point, discussing how the spectacular rise of conglomerates in the 
1960s was reversed in subsequent decades and how the 1980s 
buyout boom led by LBO associations -- the private equity firms 
of  the  day  --  collapsed.    Factors  that  undercut  conglomerate 
mergers and buyouts by LBO associations (e.g. the tightening of 
debt markets and increased regulation) potentially could do the 
same with the current wave of private equity buyouts, and cause 
at  least  a  temporary  eclipse  of  private  equity  deals.    Even  if 
conditions remain favorable to private equity, its eclipse is likely 
to  occur  in  a  different  way.    Privacy  has  been  a  hallmark  of 
private  equity,  with  industry  leaders  operating  as  secretive 
partnerships  that  negotiate  buyouts  behind  closed  doors  and 
restructure  portfolio  companies  outside  the  public  gaze.  
However,  assuming  market  conditions  remain  sufficiently 
favorable,  top  private  equity  firms,  following  the  lead  of  the 
Blackstone Group, may well carry out public offerings.  If this 
happens,  then  even  if  the  taking  private  of  publicly  quoted 
companies remains a mainstream pursuit, the exercise will occur 
largely under the umbrella of public markets.   
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Introduction 
 
A senior partner at Texas Pacific, a leading private equity firm, 
said at a 2007 conference ‘You can’t pick up the paper or turn on 
the TV and not hear about P.E. (private equity).’
1  Private equity, 
characterized by firms operating as privately held partnerships 
organizing  the  acquisition  and  ‘taking  private’  of  public 
companies, is newsworthy due to deals that are growing rapidly 
in  number  and  scale.
2    For  seventeen  years,  the  iconic  1989 
buyout  of  RJR  Nabisco  orchestrated  by  Kohlberg  Kravis  and 
Roberts (KKR) and immortalized in Barbarians at the Gate
3 held 
the record as the largest such transaction.
4  The title fell in July 
2006  when  KKR  beat  its  own  record  when  buying  HCA,  a 
hospital chain, fell again in November 2006 when the Blackstone 
Group, another leading private equity firm, agreed to buy Equity 
Office Properties and was poised to fall again when in 2007 KKR 
and Texas Pacific offered $45 billion to acquire TXU Corp., a 
Texas energy company.
5  There has even been speculation that 
Microsoft could be a target before long.
6    
 
The rise of private equity has been characterized as a signpost on 
the way to a new financial order we can barely even recognize 
right now.
7  The taking private of public companies by private 
equity indeed has potentially crucial ramifications for the shape 
of capitalism.  Since the early decades of the 20
th century the 
publicly  quoted  company  has  been  the  dominant  form  of 
business enterprise in the U.S.
8  The surge in public-to-private 
buyout  activity  occurring  over  the  past  few  years  calls  into 
question  the  continued  pre-eminence  of  the  public  company.  
This is not a novel insight.  Economist Michael Jensen, in a 1989 
article written at the peak of a 1980s wave of public-to-private 
buyouts,  speculated  about  ‘The  Eclipse  of  the  Public 
Corporation.’
9    His  pronouncement  proved  premature,  but  the 
current wave of buyout activity has revived speculation that the 
publicly quoted company could be largely marginalized in the   3
not-too-distant  future,  with  significant  governance  and 
investment implications.   
 
Proprietors of private equity firms have indeed proclaimed they 
are  in  the  vanguard  of  change,  challenging  a  deeply  flawed 
public company structure.  Stephen Schwarzman, co-founder of 
Blackstone,  has  suggested  ‘public  markets  are  overrated’, 
arguing  that  regulation  is  ‘a  brake  on  American  public 
companies’ that is leading to a ‘going out of business sale’ for 
public  corporations.
10    Or  as  the  head  of  Clayton,  Dubilier  & 
Rice,  another  private  equity  firm,  has  said,  ‘the  classic 
shareholder  model is a  terrible one’.
11  Some public company 
executives agree.  Henry Silverman, who between 1997 and 2006 
was  chief  executive  officer  of  Cendant,  a  publicly  traded 
conglomerate, said in a 2007 interview:  ‘There is no reason to be 
a public company anymore.’
12  Moreover, it appears the trend in 
favor of going private buyouts extends potentially to any and all 
public companies.  As the managing director of Bain Capital, a 
private  equity  firm,  said  in  2007,  ‘Today  there  isn’t  a  public 
board out there that hasn’t talked once about private equity’.
13   
If it is true that doing business under a private equity structure 
really is  better, this implies the public company’s days as the 
dominant type of business organization are numbered.
14  Echoing 
Jensen,  there  has  indeed  recently  been  much  speculation  that 
private equity could soon displace  the public company.  As a 
lawyer for private equity firms claimed in the Wall Street Journal 
in 2006 ‘(w)e are seeing a significant privatization of corporate 
America’.
15    Similarly,  when  the  Financial  Times  newspaper 
launched  in  2006  a  list  of  the  top  business  enterprises  in  the 
world that were not traded on the stock market, it justified doing 
so on the basis ‘private equity’s unprecedented prominence has 
sparked concerns of a creeping ‘privatisation’ of large chunks of 
the  US  and  European  economies,  which  would  reduce 
management’s accountability to the wider public and deny small 
investors the chance to buy into these companies.’
16     4
 
‘(T)he flight of corporations from public investors and into the 
arms of ‘private equity’’ has been characterized as a ‘dangerous 
trend’.
17  Private equity’s rise has generated particular concern 
with  respect  to  investors,  financial  markets  and  the  ethical 
orientation  of  business.    Investing  in  private  equity  buyouts 
involves  much  higher  transaction  costs  and  greater  risk  than 
investing  in  a  public  company,  due  to  high  debt  burdens  on 
companies operating under the umbrella of private equity, a lack 
of  liquidity  for  those  who  finance  the  funds  that  execute  the 
buyouts and substantial fees charged by private equity firms.
18   
 
Moreover, private equity’s unseating of the widely held company 
could shortchange mainstream private investors.  Private equity 
firms  usually  only  seek  investment  capital  from  those  with 
substantial  financial  wherewithal,  such  as  pension  funds, 
charitable  endowments  and  super-wealthy  individuals.  
Moreover, private equity’s success allegedly is partially due to 
being able to secure buyouts at bargain-basement prices, meaning 
ordinary shareholders lose.
19  A 2006 Washington Post columnist 
made  the  point  forcefully  in  a  piece  entitled  ‘A  Capitalist 
Swindle’, saying  of  private equity  buyouts  ‘But  if these  deals 
aren’t a swindle, then the stock market itself is a swindle.  It does 
not maximize value for its working- and middle-class investors.  
The stock market leaves money on the table waiting for ‘private 
equity’ to swoop down and pick it up.’
20 
 
With financial markets, for stock exchanges the displacement of 
the publicly quoted company by private equity could have dire 
implications  over  the  long  haul.    Currently,  rumors  of  private 
equity  buyouts  are  pushing  up  the  share  prices  of  various 
potential  targets.
21    However,  as  a  public  company  director 
pointed out in a 2007 column in the Financial Times newspaper, 
‘if private venturers keep drawing the best blood out of the listed 
markets,  (stock)  exchanges…will  suffer  a  long  and  gruesome   5
death’.
22  Indeed, it becomes possible to imagine within ten years 
‘a world where no company making real things or marketing real 
services is listed and stock exchanges trade only bonds, funds, 
high-tech start-ups and dodgy exploration outfits’.
23  
  
Additionally,  the  rise  of  private  equity  arguably  could 
compromise  business  ethics.    Public  companies  operate  in the 
public  spotlight,  which  creates  pressure  for  them  to  carry  on 
business in a socially responsible manner.
24  When a large public 
company is bought by private equity it vanishes, since the regular 
earnings  releases,  annual  reports  and  shareholder  meetings 
associated  with  being  a  public  company  are  followed  by  an 
‘information  blackout’.
25    Advocates  of  private  equity  cite 
privacy  as  a  virtue,  saying  companies  that  have  been  taken 
private  can  get  their  heads  down  and  make  serious  money 
without worrying about troublesome disclosure regulations and 
cranky outside shareholders.  At the same time, critics of private 
equity  have  argued  the  demise  of  the  public  company  could 
diminish  greatly  the  population  of  big,  transparent  and  ethical 
corporate  citizens.    They  cite  in  particular  industries  with  a 
significant  public  profile  (e.g.  media  companies),  noting 
companies  taken  private  will  be  less  open  to  scrutiny  by  the 
public, the press and investment analysts.
26   
 
Even  if  private  equity  does  become  dominant,  these  various 
concerns might well be overstated.  Private equity, as this paper 
will describe, can yield benefits for those who finance buyout 
funds  because  those  running  companies  operating  under  the 
umbrella  of  private  equity  typically  have  robust  incentives  to 
meet prescribed financial targets and those running private equity 
firms should be well-situated to take corrective action if things 
goes awry.  Also, public-to-private buyouts do not necessarily 
imply  the  death  knell  of  the  stock  market,  since  initial  public 
offerings  (IPOs)  constitute  an  important  private  equity  exit 
option.    Moreover,  private  equity  firms  do  have  incentives  to   6
conduct themselves in a socially responsible manner, even if only 
to close deals and forestall tight regulation of their industry.  For 
instance,  after  lengthy  negotiations  with  environmental  groups 
the private equity buyers of TXU committed to scale back on an 
unpopular plan to build new coal plants and to adhere to a strict 
set of environmental rules.
27   
 
Debate on these points takes for granted the continuing rise of 
private equity and the corresponding displacement of the public 
company.  This trend should in fact not be taken for granted.  
Though private equity has considerable momentum currently, it 
is unlikely that private equity firms will, by acquiring and taking 
private  ever  larger  public  companies,  marginalize  the  stock 
market as a centerpiece of U.S. capitalism.  Instead, there are two 
likely trajectories, perhaps operating in tandem.   
 
First, the current set of market and legal conditions, which are 
highly  congenial  to  public-to-private  transactions,  could  be 
disrupted in ways that cause the private equity surge to stall or 
even  go  into  reverse.    If  the  switch  in  momentum  is  strong 
enough, the private equity model could be discredited, at least 
temporarily,  and  public-to-private  buyouts  will  become  the 
exception rather than the rule.  This paper draws on history to 
make  this  point,  discussing  how  the  spectacular  rise  of 
conglomerates in the 1960s was reversed in subsequent decades 
and  outlining  how  the  buyout  boom  led  by  the  1980s 
predecessors to today’s private equity firms – christened ‘LBO 
associations’  by  Jensen
28  –  collapsed,  putting  public-to-private 
buyout activity in a ‘deep freeze’ for at least decade thereafter.  
Factors  that  undercut  the  conglomerates  and  buyouts  by  LBO 
associations potentially could do the same with the current wave 
of public-to-private deals, and cause at least a temporary eclipse 
of private equity.    
   7
Second,  the  ownership  structure  of  private  equity  may  well 
change fundamentally soon.  Private equity firms are, in most 
instances, private partnerships, meaning that when they carry out 
buyouts of public companies, the operating entities typically do 
become  truly  and  entirely  private.    Assuming  market  and 
regulatory  conditions  remain  stable  over  at  least  the  medium 
term, the ownership structure of private equity firms could well 
change  radically  soon.    One  possibility  is  that  some  could  be 
bought by public companies, perhaps investment banks.  More 
likely,  at  least  with  the  leading  private  equity  firms,  is  going 
public; Blackstone in fact filed in March 2007 with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission documentation in support of an IPO.  
If either or both become a trend, the taking private of operating 
companies  will  occur  under  the  umbrella  of  public  markets.
29  
Thus, in a different but nevertheless important respect there will 
be an eclipse of private equity.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a précis of private 
equity.    Part  II  surveys  the  history  of  merger  transactions  to 
identify precedents for the current private equity boom, arguing 
that a wave of conglomerate mergers in the 1960s and the deals 
carried out by LBO associations in the 1980s offer instructive 
parallels.  Part III offers a detailed comparison of conglomerates 
and  the  private  equity  firms  carrying  out  buyouts  today, 
acknowledging that drawing analogies must be done with care 
but  nevertheless  are  potentially  instructive.    Part  IV  outlines 
contingencies  that  could  precipitate  the  fall  of  private  equity, 
drawing on the experience with the conglomerate merger wave of 
the  1960s  and  the  leveraged  buyout  boom  of  the  1980s  to 
illustrate.  Part V argues that even if private equity continues to 
grow in importance, a fundamental aspect of its private nature – 
the organization of buyout firms as private partnerships – could 
well change, thus bringing private equity under the umbrella of 
the stock market.  Part VI concludes.    
   8
I. Private Equity’s ‘Public-To-Private’ Buyouts:  A Précis 
 
Various  transactions  can  be  classified  as  ‘private  equity’ 
transactions,  with  the  unifying  theme  being  that  the  capital 
involved has been raised privately and will not be deployed by 
investing  in  publicly  traded  securities.
30    These  include  the 
provision  of  funding  for  fledgling  businesses  or  ‘start  ups’ 
(known  as  ‘venture  capital’),  the  injection  of  funding  into 
existing businesses to help them expand (‘development capital’), 
buyouts of privately owned companies, buyouts of divisions of 
publicly  quoted  companies,  typically  by  management 
(‘management buyouts’) and the acquisition and ‘taking private’ 
of publicly quoted firms.
31  While the term private equity is apt 
for a number of different types of deals, over the past few years 
the term has become popularly associated with the buying out 
and  taking  private  of  public  companies,
32  with  the  objective 
being to deliver superior risk-adjusted returns by improving the 
financial  performance  and  growth  profile  of  the  acquired 
companies.   
 
The  private  equity  firms  that  orchestrate  public-to-private 
buyouts are typically organized as private partnerships.  In the 
U.S. the top five, ranked by Fortune magazine in 2007 on the 
basis of funds raised for buyouts, were the Blackstone Group, 
KKR,  the  Carlyle  Group,  the  Texas  Pacific  Group  and  Bain 
Capital.
33  A private equity firm will not raise funds to carry out 
acquisitions  on  its  own  behalf.    Instead,  it  will  periodically 
establish  individual  funds,  each  organized  as  a  limited 
partnership, to raise capital to buy equity stakes in the companies 
to be bought.  Partners in the private equity firm will serve as the 
general partners in these limited partnerships and the investors 
who provide the cash will be the limited partners, meaning they 
benefit  from  limited  liability  but  cannot  participate  in  the 
management of the limited partnerships.
34   
   9
The general partners in a private equity fund usually own only a 
tiny  fraction  of  the  limited  partnership  investment  funds  they 
establish.
35  The general partners’ returns are generated primarily 
by way of an annual management fee based on a fixed percentage 
of committed capital (typically between 1%  and 3%, with the 
norm being 2%) and a stipulated share of the fund’s profits, often 
referred to as ‘carried interest’ or ‘carry’.
36  The management fee 
and  the  carry  are  both  elements  of  what  is  referred  to  as  the 
‘waterfall’  created  by  the  distribution  provisions  in  the 
partnership  agreement  underlying  a  private  equity  investment 
fund.
37    Carried  interest  is  most  often  set  at  20%  of  a 
partnership’s net return, often with a ‘hurdle rate’ that has to be 
exceeded  for  the  general  partners  to  claim  profits  but  also 
employing  a  ‘catch-up’  clause  which  means  that  once  profits 
move  above  the  hurdle  level  the  general  partners  claim  any 
further profits until the 80/20 split is restored.
38  Since the size of 
the carry depends on performance, those running a private equity 
firm have a direct financial incentive to achieve good results with 
each  investment  fund  they  establish.
39    Industry-wide,  partner 
returns from carried interest outnumber those from management 
fees by a ratio of 4 to 3.
40 
 
Private  equity  firms  have  traditionally  organized  their  buyout 
activities with great care to ensure neither they nor the funds they 
establish  are  subject  to  the  regulations  that  govern  collective 
investment  vehicles  in  which  private  investors  can  routinely 
invest.  More precisely, private equity firms will take advantage 
of exemptions that ensure they will not be subject to restrictions 
imposed  by  the  Investment  Company  Act  1940  and  organize 
fund-raising for the limited partnership interests they establish to 
ensure  a  registration  for  an  offer  and  sale  of  securities  is  not 
required under the Securities Act of 1933.
41  On the latter count, 
a crucial step private equity firms take is to rely on ‘professional’ 
investor  exemptions  under  U.S.  securities  law,  meaning  they 
raise  capital  exclusively  from  ‘professional’  or  ‘sophisticated’   10
investors,  such  as  pension  funds,  insurance  companies,  large 
charitable endowments and high net-worth individuals.
42  There 
is typically a high minimum subscription for participation in new 




Stakes in private equity investment funds generally provide little 
in the way of liquidity for the limited partners.  Most private 
equity funds are established for a fixed term, typically 10 years, 
consisting  of  an  investment  period  when  the  general  partners 
make  capital  calls  and  a  holding  period  where  existing 
investments  are  managed,  developed  and  ultimately  sold.
44  
When  the  term  has  expired,  unless  the  partners  consent  to  an 
extension,  the  fund  must  sell  its  investments  and  return  the 
capital to fund investors.
45  Limited partners are usually subject 
to a ‘lock-up’ period precluding redemption or transfer of their 
stake  throughout  the  entire  duration  of  the  fund  or  until  all 
investments  have  been  successfully  divested.
46    There  may 
nevertheless  be  an  exit  option,  assuming  proper  approvals  are 
obtained, this being a market for ‘secondaries’ involving interests 
in  private  equity  funds  purchased  from  the  original  investors 
before the expiry of the fund.
47   
 
Despite  the  sizeable  fees  charged  by  general  partners,  hefty 
minimum investment thresholds and the lack of liquidity, private 
equity buyout funds have proved to be an attractive investment 
option.  In particular, leading private equity firms have been able 
to accumulate huge pools of capital available for buyouts.  In 
2006 alone, five funds were established that raised $10 billion or 
more.
48    The  largest  private  equity  firms  have  increased  their 
buying capacity further by forming consortia in which they work 
together to acquire very large public-to-private targets.
49   
 
Debt magnifies the buying power of private equity still further.
50  
To illustrate, if a private equity fund arranges to pay $10 billion   11
in cash to carry out a buyout of a public company and it borrows 
$7.5 billion, then it will pay a maximum of $2.5 billion for the 
equity.    This  sort  of  deal  structure  is  hardly  atypical.    Debt 
typically accounts for between 55% and 85% of the capital base 
of private equity buyouts.
51   
 
When seeking buyout targets, smaller private equity firms quite 
often invest in only one or two sectors of the economy, such as 
infrastructure  or  technology.
52    Larger  private  equity  firms  in 
contrast  will  consider  pretty  much  any  business  sector.    For 
instance,  as  of  2006  KKR  funds  had  invested  in  chemicals, 
consumer  products,  energy  and  natural  resources,  financial 
services, health care, industrial companies, hotels/leisure, media 
communications, retail and technology.
53  Similarly, Blackstone 
had a portfolio including stakes in an arts and crafts retailer, a 
pharmaceuticals  company,  a  drinks  firm,  a  bond  insurer,  a 
publisher and Madame Tussauds waxworks museums.
54   
 
A  private  equity  fund  that  is  carrying  out  an  acquisition  will 
usually opt to negotiate a ‘friendly’ deal with senior executives 
of the target.  This is because private equity investors frequently 
insist on bans on ‘hostile’ takeovers and because management’s 
co-operation will give a private equity buyer an advantage large 
enough to discourage rival bids that can create expensive bidding 
contests.
55  Assuming a deal can be struck, the target will usually 
be  taken  private,  meaning  that  control  will  not  merely  be 
obtained but that the shares of all public investors will be bought 
and the company de-listed from the stock market.
56   
 
A private equity fund will not seek to own 100% of the stock in 
the companies they buy.  Instead, the executives who will run the 
company  –  either  the  incumbent  management  team  or  new 
recruits -- usually take up a substantial percentage of the equity, 
financed at least in part by their own capital.
57  Chief executives 
of  a  company  taken  private  can  own  as  much  as  10%  of  the   12
business  themselves.
58    The  idea  is  that  managers  of  the 
‘investee’ companies should ‘have some skin in the game’.
59  If 
matters proceed as planned, management can become very rich, 
and  do  so  without  little  of  the  potentially  adverse  publicity 
associated with generous executive pay in public companies.  For 
instance, the former chief executive of the Gap retail chain made 
$300 million running clothing retailer J. Crew on behalf of Texas 
Pacific between 2003 and J. Crew’s 2006 initial public offering.
60  
According  to  some  observers,  ‘(t)he  biggest  secret  of  private 
equity…is the incentives paid to managers’.
61   
 
While in a company that has been taken private stock ownership 
constitutes  the  ‘carrot’,  the  debt  load  incurred  to  finance  the 
buyout  constitutes  the  ‘stick’.
62    Since  most  of  the  ‘free  cash 
flow’  (essentially  operating  cash  flow  minus  capital 
expenditures)  will  be  committed  to  debt  service,  management 
will  be  forced  to  adhere  to  strict,  results-oriented  financial 
projections.
63  Debt covenants typically reinforce the discipline 
on management by obliging executives to operate the company 
within tight budgetary and operational constraints.
64   
 
While a private equity fund will not own all of the shares in the 
companies it acquires, it will own a large enough stake to dictate 
who sits on the board of directors.
65  The general partners will 
often sit on the board themselves and stay fully abreast of the 
company’s  situation  through  board  meetings  and  detailed 
financial reports.  If the executives of a portfolio company are 
struggling, the general partners can use their power at board level 
to  execute  swift  executive  turnover.
66    Normally,  though,  the 
general partners will opt for an advisory role, drawing on their 
prior  experience  with  restructuring  businesses  and  on  contacts 
they  have  with  management  consultants,  accountants  and  law 
firms to provide direction, advice and technical support.
67  They 
will also often supplement expertise at board level by recruiting 
directors with expertise in the relevant industrial sector or the   13
management of business more generally.  The overall result is a 
more dynamic and challenging boardroom style than prevails in 
public  companies,  since  the  outside  directors  can  focus  on 
trading and strategy rather than compliance issues and committee 
duties.
68  As a top executive at a Fortune 100 company said in 
2006, ‘Do I want a board of people who are owners that want to 
make a business, or a group that acts like scared regulators?  I’d 
much  rather  have  a  strong  businessman  on  my  board  than  a 
Harvard professor who is an expert on corporate governance who 
only wants to talk about process’.
69      
 
Since  private  equity  funds  have  a  fixed  duration,  portfolio 
companies  are  always  managed  with  an  advantageous  sale  in 
mind, rather than on any sort of open-ended basis.  The three 
core exit options are carrying out a public offering, selling the 
company in a ‘trade sale’ to a corporate buyer and a ‘secondary 
sale’ to another private equity firm.
70  Private equity owners can 
also generate returns from an investee company by carrying out a 
leveraged recapitalization, a process where the company pays out 
large  one-off  dividends  to  shareholders,  including  the  private 
equity fund, financed by new borrowings.
71   
 
The fixed duration of private equity investment funds reinforces 
the incentive structure associated with buyouts.  The executives 
running the operating companies will know, due to the obligation 
to divest, there is a guarantee of future liquidity occurring by way 
of  an  unbiased  valuation  event.
72    As  for  the  private  equity 
partners running a particular fund, since they must dispose of all 
assets  within  a  fixed  period  of  time,  they  will  be  strongly 
motivated to move swiftly to get portfolio companies into shape 
for an advantageous sale.
73  Moreover, private equity firms who 
exit  investments  sufficiently  promptly  to  return  capital  well 
before  a  fund  must  be  wound  up  will  have  an  advantage  in 
raising  fresh  capital  in  the  future  since  investors  will,  all else 
being  equal,  prefer  to  get  their  cash  back  sooner  rather  than   14
later.
74  Private equity firms thus always must be ready to sell if 
the  right  opportunity  arises.    As  the  founder  of  Texas  Pacific 
Group has said ‘Every day you don’t sell a portfolio company 
you’ve made an implicit buy decisions’.
75   
 
II.  Previous Merger Waves 
 
To  anticipate  the  future  trajectory  of  private  equity,  it  is 
instructive to turn to history.  Since buyouts of public companies 
constitute the core feature of private equity, prior merger waves 
constitute the obvious departure point for the enquiry.  Merger 
activity  does  not  occur  steadily  over  time.    Instead,  there  are 
periods  when  mergers  are  plentiful  and  other  periods  when 
takeover activity lulls.
76  Public-to-private buyouts are on the sort 
of  upswing  associated  with  a  merger  wave,  with  over  $400 
billion  worth  of  private  equity  buyouts  occurring  in  the  U.S. 
during 2006, more than three times higher than the record set in 
2005.
77  As of February 2007, eight of the ten largest public-to-
private buyouts of all-time had occurred in 2006 or 2007.
78  As 
we will see now, parallels can drawn between the current surge 
of buyout activity and merger waves occurring in the 1960s and 
1980s but not to other takeover booms the U.S. has experienced.   
 
A.  1897-1903 
 
The United States experienced its first great merger movement 
between  1897  and  1903.
79    75  per  cent  of  the  firms  that 
disappeared as a result of corporate amalgamations during the 
1897-1903 merger wave joined a consolidation involving five or 
more enterprises in the same industry.
80  This pattern turned out 
to be unique, since during subsequent waves of merger activity in 
the  U.S.  the  transactions  focused  around  the  acquisition  of  a 
single  enterprise  by  a  competitor  or  by  a  firm  engaged  in  an 
unrelated line of business.
81   
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Economist  Michael  Jensen  has  argued  the  firms  coordinating 
public-to-private  buyouts  are  rediscovering  the  role  played  by 
investment bank J.P. Morgan at the turn of the 20
th century.
82  
J.P. Morgan did orchestrate merger transactions that were on a 
scale that matches even the largest deals engineered by private 
equity  firms  now,  with  leading  examples  of  ‘Morganized’ 
companies resulting from mergers including General Electric Co. 
(1895),  United  States  Steel  Co.  (1901-02),  International 
Harvester  (1902)  and  International  Mercantile  Marine  Co. 
(1902).
83    However,  what  J.P.  Morgan  did  was  fundamentally 
different than what occurs with private equity buyouts.  With the 
mergers J.P. Morgan organized, the objective was to amalgamate 
key competitors in an industry under the umbrella of a single 
public company that could rely on economies of scale and market 
power  to  dominate  remaining  competitors.
84    In  contrast,  the 
public-to-private deals private equity firms carry out involve the 
transformation  of  the  ownership  structure  of  individual 
companies in favor of private ownership, with the achievement 
of market dominance within an industry not being an objective.   
 
B.  The 1920s 
 
The  second  merger  movement  in  the  U.S.  occurred  in  the 
1920s.
85  While there were about five times as many mergers 
during this second merger wave than there were between 1897 
and 1903, the 1920s merger movement was less spectacular since 
the  acquisition  activity  did  not  involve  the  same  sort  of  bold 
reorganizations of entire industries.
86  As was the case at the turn 
of the century, much of the merger activity was of the horizontal 
variety  but  the  standard  pattern  was  for  deals  to  involve  the 
acquisition of individual companies rather than a number of firms 
simultaneously.    A  significant  number  of  these  horizontal 
mergers were part of a series carried out by the same acquirer, 
buying up companies that had not previously competed with each 
other because they were in different parts of the country.
87  Two   16
industries particularly affected were utilities and banking; one-
third of the business enterprises that disappeared as a result of the 
1920s merger wave operated in these sectors.
88   
 
Not  all  of  the  mergers  in  the  1920s  involved  firms  that  were 
competitors or potential competitors.  There were also numerous 
‘complementary’ or ‘allied products’ mergers, with the business 
rationale being that products sold to the same general class of 
buyer  could  be  marketed  and  distributed  more  efficiently 
together.
89  Mergers of this sort were virtually unknown before 
1911, when International Business Machines was formed out of 
four largely non-competing businesses.
90  While ‘allied product’ 
mergers  meant  that  acquiring  companies  expanded  somewhat 
beyond their ‘core’ business activity, the acquirers did not buy 
companies operating in a wide range of unrelated industries in 
the way private equity firms currently do.  It was during the third 
merger wave, occurring in the 1960s, that matters changed, and 
radically so.   
 
 
C.  The 1960s 
 
The U.S. experienced its third merger wave in the late 1960s, 
with M&A activity becoming ‘almost a mania’.
91  Between 1967 
and  1969,  the  number  of  ‘large’  mergers,  as  defined  by  the 
Federal  Trade  Commission  (F.T.C.)  (i.e.  mergers  in 
manufacturing and mining industries where the company being 
bought had assets worth $10 million or more) averaged 150 per 
year, involving $10.6 billion in assets, up from averages of 66 
and $2.1 billion between 1956 and 1966.
92  In 1968 alone, 26 of 
the U.S.’s largest 500 corporations disappeared as a result of a 
merger or acquisition.
93  The number of ‘large’ mergers fell to 91 
in 1970 and then averaged only 61 per year between 1971 and 
1975.
94   
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From the mid-1950s through to the merger wave of the late 1960, 
a distinguishing feature of M&A activity was the prevalence of 
diversifying  or  conglomerate  mergers.
95    A  conglomerate  is  a 
corporation  that  owns  companies  that  operate  in  a  number  of 
largely  separate  market  sectors  and  lack  a  well-defined 
connection  between  the  products  and  services  offered.
96  
Conglomerates can, in theory, result from internal growth as the 
parent  company  launches  operating  companies  in  a  variety  of 




Textron Inc. is widely acknowledged as being the father of the 
conglomerate age.
98  Textron, operating as a textile manufacturer, 
began  its  expansion  out  of  the  industry  in  mid-1950s  when  it 
bought an upholstery supplier, a producer of radar and antenna 
equipment and an engineering company specializing in vibration 
testing  and  reduction.
99    Diversification  by  merger  continued 
thereafter,  and  before  retiring  in  the  early  1960s  Textron 
chairman Royal Little transformed Textron into a conglomerate 




Numerous  others  soon  followed  in  Textron’s  footsteps.    Of 
approximately  350  large  U.S.  companies  that  filed  ‘line  of 
business’ data with the Federal Trade Commission in the mid-
1970s, 50 had carried out 50 or more mergers between 1950 and 
1977 and approximately 40 of these companies achieved wide-
ranging  diversification  as  a  result.
101    The  conglomerates  that 
resulted from M&A activity became a major force in the U.S. 
economy.    Of  the  country’s  largest  500  corporations  as 
determined  by  Fortune  magazine  as  of  1969,  six  (including 
Textron) were companies that were well-established prior to the 
1960s that had transformed themselves into conglomerates, 21 
were established companies that were transforming themselves 
into conglomerates and 33 were ‘first generation’ conglomerates,   18
these being firms that had risen to prominence as conglomerates 
in the 1960s.
102   
 
Unlike with the merger waves occurring between 1897 and 1903 
and  in  the  1920s,  parallels  can  readily  be  drawn  between  the 
1960s  and  today  since  conglomerates,  as  with  today’s  private 
equity firms, were carrying out numerous acquisitions covering a 
wide range of industries.  Various observers have remarked upon 
the resemblance.  A New York Times writer said in 2006 of the 
large  buyout  funds  private  equity  firms  are  raising  ‘such 
megafunds  could  reinvent  the  conglomerates,  something  that 
many of these firms are resembling more and more already.’
103  
A business columnist in London’s Evening Standard newspaper 
has claimed similarly that conglomerates ‘seem to have mutated 
into  private-equity  funds  and  roam  the  land  once  more,  with 
appetites and teeth as sharp as ever.  No prey is too big or too 
tough for these investors to engulf and devour.’
104   
 
The analogy is not particularly flattering to private equity since 
the conglomerates met a fate that private equity firms would no 
doubt prefer to avoid, namely being transformed from the ‘next 
big thing’ in business to a discredited ‘fad’.
105  1969 and 1991 
articles in the Economist capture the trajectory neatly.  In 1969, 
the Economist editorialized that ‘the authorities should become 
more kindly disposed towards the growth of conglomerates in 
Britain’, citing ‘the need for fitting the right managers into the 
right  posts.’
106    In  1991  the  Economist  labeled  conglomerate 
mergers  ‘a  colossal  mistake’,  ‘almost  certainly  the  biggest 
collective error ever made by American business (and copied by 
British firms).’
107   
 
Part  III  will  consider  in  more  detail  the  extent  to  which  it  is 
appropriate to equate conglomerates with private equity.  Before 
turning  to  this  question,  we  need  to  complete  the  survey  of 
merger  waves,  turning  now  to  1980s,  when  deals  of  the  sort   19
struck  by  today’s  private  equity  firms  first  occurred  with  any 
regularity.   
 
D.  The 1980s 
 
The taking private of public companies by private equity firms is 
now so commonplace it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the 
history  of  such  transactions  is  a  fairly  short  one  and  that  the 
techniques  employed  were  highly  innovative  when  they  were 
first  used.    As  former  S.E.C.  commissioner  Joseph  Grundfest 
said in the mid-1990s of KKR, the firm that effectively launched 
private  equity  buyouts,  ‘some  of  the  most  fundamental  ideas 
consistently deployed through twenty years of KKR transactions 
are today so well accepted in modern corporate America that it 
may be hard to remember how radical these principles seemed 
when practiced by KKR in the 1970s and 1980s.’
108   
 
Prior to the mid-1970s, buyout transactions designed explicitly to 
remove a viable publicly quoted company from the stock market 
were  pretty  much  unknown.    A  consultant  for  Bankers  Trust 
wrote  in  a  1974  New  York  Times  article  entitled  ‘Why 
Companies Want to Go Private’ that investment bankers advising 
managers  of  medium-sized  companies  were  inspired  by  five 
fundamental truths, the first of which was ‘Thou shalt go public’ 
and the last of which was ‘Thou art married to Wall Street until 
death.’
109  He remarked as well ‘going private is not a simple 
process’, citing a securities law ‘maze’,
110 reflecting the fact that 
the basic contours of the transaction were not well understood by 
lawyers, accountants and regulators.   
 
Finance  constituted  a  further  obstacle  to  going  private 
transactions,  since  third  parties  with  available  cash  were  not 
getting  involved  in  the  deals.    As  the 1974  New  York  Times 
article on going private said ‘Funds for the purchase of shares in 
a tender offer must generally come from the family who owned   20
the company before its public debut or from management that is 
willing to supplement the corporate coffers and thus be rid of the 
stockholder  plague.’
111    Thus,  while  the  number  of  ‘going 
private’ transactions increased from 0 in 1973 to 14 in 1974, 13 
lacked any ‘third-party’ equity participation.
112  This was the gap 
that  the  private  equity  fund,  involving  the  establishment  of  a 
partnership for the express purpose of raising funds privately to 
carry out buyouts, ultimately filled.   
 
Debt constituted another key missing piece of the puzzle.  It was 
nothing  new  for  borrowing  to  be  used  to  finance  corporate 
acquisitions.
113    J.P.  Morgan’s  1902  merger  of  shipping  lines, 
resulting in the formation of International Merchant Marine Co., 
was  financed  largely  by  the  issuance  of  debt  and  preferred 
stock.
114    Henry  Ford,  majority  shareholder  in  Ford  Motor 
Company, borrowed 70% of the purchase price in order to buy 
out  the  company’s  minority  shareholders  in  1919.
115  
Nevertheless, serious exploration of the boundaries of the use of 
leverage only began in the mid-1960s, with Jerome Kohlberg, 
Henry Kravis and George Roberts being pioneers.  Over the next 
decade, these three, working for investment bank Bear Stearns, 
orchestrated the financing of a number of buyouts on behalf of a 
series  of  aging  entrepreneurs  operating  private  companies 
looking for a way to take cash out of the business while retaining 
control and on behalf of a number of managers of divisions of 
large conglomerates seeking to buy the business and strike out on 
their own.
116  In so doing, Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts made a 
novel  pitch  they  would  hone  over  time,  namely  that  with 
appropriate use of debt sufficient cash could be generated to pay 




In 1976, after Bear Stearns turned down a proposal by Kohlberg, 
Kravis and Roberts to establish a separate unit to deal with the 
transactions they were doing, they formed KKR.
118  Around this   21
time the term ‘leveraged buyout’ began to be used regularly,
119 
and  KKR  quickly  became  synonymous  with  it.    KKR  had  a 
modest  start,  raising  funds  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  from  wealthy 
individual backers and only doing three deals in 1977 and none 
in 1978.
120  However, in 1978 KKR created the first ever private 
equity fund with a specific mandate to finance public-to-private 
buyouts.
121  It was a partnership based on an established venture 
capital  model,  with  fund  investors  being  limited  partners  who 
entrusted  a  fixed  contribution  of  cash  to  the  KKR  general 
partners,  who  decided  where  and  how  the  money  would  be 
invested  within  a  predefined  period  of  time.    The  limited 
partners, who invested a total of $30 million, included Allstate, 
the  insurers,  Teachers  Insurance,  a  pension  fund,  and  venture 
capital funds from a number of banks, including Citicorp.
122   
 
KKR’s 1979 acquisition of Houdaille Industries constituted the 
first  modern  public-to-private  buyout  of  a  sizeable  public 
company.
123  Whereas the median market value of going private 
transactions carried out between 1974 and 1980 was a modest 
$5.97  million,
124  the  purchase  price  for  Houdaille  was  $355 
million.
125  Of this amount 87% was financed by debt raised from 
banks, institutional investors and venture capital subsidiaries of 
investment  banks.
126    The  remainder  was  paid  for  by  those 
destined to own shares in the firm after it had been taken private, 
these  being  younger  Houdaille  executives  who  would  run  the 
company,  the  KKR  1978  equity  fund  and  some  institutional 
investors loyal to KKR.
127  The complex financial arrangements 
and an elaborate tax strategy adopted to generate substantial tax 
savings  were  subject  to  careful  scrutiny  by  lawyers  and 
regulators, but after the Houdaille deal went through, imitators 
soon followed.
128  Despite a deep recession, between 1979 and 
1982 the number of public company buyouts increased from 16 
to 31, and the average value of the deals involved went up from 
$64.9 million to $112.2 million.
129  
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A 1982 management buyout of Gibson Greetings, a Cincinnati 
subsidiary of RCA, provided a further impetus for LBOs.  The 
cost was $80 million, with debt financing providing $79 million.  
In 1983 30% of the company was sold in a public offering at a 
price implying the value of the company was $330 million.
130  
This  ‘turned  heads  on  Wall  Street’  and  ‘(s)uddenly  everyone 
wanted  to  try  this  ‘LBO  thing’.’
131    For  those  intending  to 
orchestrate LBOs – typically operating as what were to become 
known as LBO associations -- it was becoming standard practice 
to raise finance for public-to-private deals by establishing funds 
akin  to  KKR’s  1978  fund,  and  investors  signed  up 
enthusiastically.
132    New  commitments  to  non-venture  capital 
private equity investment funds rose from $0.5 billion in 1982 to 
$1.9 billion in 1983 and again to $14.7 billion by 1987.
133  
 
Innovative  use  of  debt  further  enhanced  the  buying  power  of 
LBO associations.  High-yield, low grade paper christened ‘junk 
bonds’ were rarely used to finance leveraged buyouts during the 
first half of the 1980s, but were used in a majority of such deals 
in the remainder of the decade.
134  As with the basic public-to-
private  buyout  transaction,  KKR  led  the  way.    The  firm 
developed a close relationship with Drexel Burnham Lambert’s 
junk  bond  impresario  Michael  Milken,  resulting  in  KKR 
becoming  Drexel’s  biggest  borrowing  client  and  Milken 
depicting  KKR  ‘as  a  great  agent  of  change  in  a  sweeping 
financial revolution’.
135  KKR relied on junk bonds to finance a 
number of major deals in the mid-1980s, including Beatrice, the 
26
th largest company on the Fortune 500 list at the time KKR 
announced its bid for control in 1985.
136   
 
Before  long  virtually  every  LBO  association  and  brokerage 
house was using high-yield bonds, which meant numerous third-
party buyers could mount tender sizeable offers at a moment’s 
notice.
137  The deals duly followed, as public-to-private buyouts 
formed an important element of what became the fourth merger   23
wave  in  the  U.S.
138    During  1985,  76  U.S.  going  private 
transactions  took  place,  with  the  average  value  being  $473.6 
million.    In  1988  there  were  125  going  private  deals,  at  an 
average value of $487.7 million.
139  There were not just more 
buyouts,  however.    Instead,  deals  being  done  became 
progressively riskier.  According to a study of 124 going private 
transactions  undertaken  throughout  the  1980s,  buyouts  carried 
out in 1985 and later were more susceptible to financial distress, 
having  been  undertaken  in  riskier  industries  and  with  higher 
leverage ratios.
140   
 
To reassert its dominance in this newly competitive milieu, KKR 
aspired to carry out a ‘megadeal’, recognizing this might require 
it to abandon a long-standing policy against hostile bids.
141  The 
result was that, after a bidding war among LBO firms, a KKR-led 
investment syndicate including Morgan Stanley, Drexel Burnham 
and  Merrill  Lynch  purchased  RJR  Nabisco  in  1989  for  $25 
billion, plus $7 billion in financing expenses.
142  This deal was 
four times larger than any other leveraged buyout of the 1980s, 
143 and set a record for the largest such deal that stood until 2006. 
 
The RJR Nabisco deal proved to be the crest of a wave.  By 
1990, the buyout boom had come to a shuddering halt, generating 
headlines in the business press such as ‘Hard Lessons from the 
Debt  Decade’  and  ‘Leveraged  Buyouts  Fall  to  Earth’.
144    The 
causes, discussed in more detail in Part IV of the paper, included 
tightened  credit  markets,  a  nascent  recession  and  adverse 
regulatory  changes.    Funding  for  buyouts  duly  declined,  with 
new  commitments  to  private  equity  (venture  capital  excluded) 
falling from $11.9 billion in 1989 to $4.8 billion in 1990 and 
$5.6  billion  in  1991.
145    Buyout  activity  declined  even  more 
rapidly, with the aggregate value of LBO transactions plunging 
from $75.8 billion in 1989 to $17.9 billion in 1990 and $8 billion 
in 1992.
146  
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E.  The 1990s 
 
As the American economy emerged from recession in the mid-
1990s,  merger  and  acquisition  activity  was  rekindled.    The 
aggregate  value  of  announced  M&A  transactions  in  the  US 
increased  from  just  over  $100  billion  in  1992  to  almost  $600 
billion  in  1996  and  the  number  of  completed  deals  rose  from 
3,500  to  6,100.
147    This  constituted  the  beginning  of  the  fifth 
merger wave in U.S. history.
148   
 
The  U.S.  merger  boom  of  the  1990s  was  driven  primarily  by 
managers  of  large  corporations  carrying  out  what  were 
characterized as strategically motivated deals designed to foster 
vertical integration, capitalize on economies of scale or exploit 
the  advent  of  new  technologies.
149    The  public-to-private 
transactions that were a hallmark of the 1980s remained in the 
doldrums  for  much  of  the  1990s.    There  were  fewer  than  20 
public-to-private transactions per year between 1991 and 1996, 
matching the pre-merger wave 1979-81 average, and LBOs fell 
from 5.9% of completed mergers in 1992 to 2.4% in 1996.
150   
 
LBO associations – rechristened private equity firms in the mid-
1990s  –  did  not  fade  completely  from  the  scene.
151    New 
commitments to private equity – venture capital excluded – rose 
from $9.9 billion in 1993 to $25.5 billion in 1996.
152  Private 
equity firms, given the low volume of public-to-private buyouts, 
relied  on  other  transactions  to  invest  the  funds  they  were 
accumulating.    One  popular  type  of  deal  was  buying 
underperforming  divisions  or  subsidiaries  from  large  publicly 
traded companies and using new management and fresh capital to 
reinvigorate the businesses before orchestrating an exit.
153  Also 
important was a deal KKR pioneered known as the ‘leveraged 
build up’, which involved backing a management team making a 
string of acquisitions in a fragmented industry with the objective 
being to build a focused company that could be taken public.
154    25
This  pattern  was  part  of  a  broader  trend  in  the  1990s  merger 
wave, these being ‘roll ups’ involving large scale acquisitions of 




F.  Revival of the Public-to-Private Transaction 
 
Economists  Bengt  Holmstrom  and  Steven  Kaplan  argued  in  a 
2001 paper that public-to-private LBOs had been eclipsed in the 
1990s because such transactions were no longer needed.  They 
reasoned the key rationale for going private, namely restructuring 
wayward public companies, was no longer relevant.  This was 
because public company executives, due to a large increase in 
incentive-based  executive  compensation  and  closer  monitoring 
by  shareholders  and  directors,  were,  on  their  own  initiative, 
pursuing shareholder-friendly policies.
156  In fact, to paraphrase 
Mark  Twain’s  famous  response  to  a  premature  newspaper 




Despite Holmstrom and Kaplan’s claim that the public-to-private 
transaction  was  no  longer  needed,  the  number  of  U.S.  public 
companies taken private rose from fewer than 20 per year to over 
60 in 1998, a level sustained through to 2002.
158  Private equity 
firms,  with  plentiful  funds  to  invest,  were  constantly  on  the 
lookout  for  undervalued  situations,  and  eventually  found 
promising candidates among stable, low-growth ‘Old Economy’ 
companies  who,  due  to  being  forgotten  by  investors  amid  the 
tech-driven  stock  market  boom,  had  shares  cheap  by  historic 
measures.
159  Since bond markets remained tight, however, the 
size of the deals remained small compared to those carried out in 
the  late  1980s,  with  private  equity  firms  being  constrained 
because they had to use a significant amount of their own cash to 
make  the  deals  work.
160    Hence,  while  the  number  of  LBOs 
executed per year actually reached an all-time high as the 1990s   26
drew  to  close,  the  aggregate  value  of  the  deals  struck  was 
considerably less than in the 1980s.
161   
 
Over the past few years, the ingredients for the current private 
equity boom have fallen into place.  Numerous additional U.S. 
companies  became  potential  candidates  for  going  private 
transactions after share prices fell in the wake of the ‘dot-com’ 
stock  market  frenzy  and  after  the  enactment  of  the  Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002 increased the administrative and regulatory 
costs associated with being a public company.
162  Private equity 
firms  had  great  success  securing  backing  for  the  investment 
funds  they  launched  amid  general  enthusiasm  for  ‘alternative’ 
investment  strategies  among  investors  frustrated  by  pedestrian 
results  delivered  by  the  stock  market  and  wary  of  low  yields 
available from corporate and government bonds.
163  For instance, 
pension funds poured billions into the sector, believing private 
equity  is  ‘their  best  hope’.
164    Indeed,  since  ‘(p)rivate  equity 
seemingly  can  do  no  wrong  in  investors’  eyes’,
165  some  have 
begun to fear there could be a private equity ‘bubble’ akin to that 
in  the  ‘dot-com’  era.
166    Much  of  the  enthusiasm  for  private 
equity is to due a widely held belief of high past performance, 
even though calculating returns reliably is difficult to do and the 
empirical evidence on point is mixed.
167   
 
Changes in the market for debt have also fuelled private equity 
buyouts.    Due  to  low  interest  rates  and  historically  small 
differentials  between  high-yield  and  investment  grade  debt 
borrowing to carry out mergers is currently very ‘cheap’.
168  Also 
debt is plentiful, due to liberal lending by banks and a booming 
market  for  credit  derivatives  dominated  by  hedge  funds  and 
functioning largely outside the regulated banking industry.
169  In 
2006, $183.3 billion in high-yield debt was issued, up 52% from 
2005.
170   
   27
The  extraordinarily  loose  monetary  conditions  have  in  turn 
created an ideal environment for private equity activity.
171  When 
private equity firms face significant borrowing constraints, they 
operate at a disadvantage as compared with a corporate buyer in 
a target’s industry, since the latter can justify a higher bid on the 
basis  it  can  achieve  cost  efficiencies  through  synergies  and 
economies of scale unavailable to the private equity firm.
172  This 
handicap  is  currently  irrelevant.    As  the  chief  executive  of  a 
hedge fund said in 2006 ‘Right now, debt is so cheap that you 
can borrow and buy another company for less than it would cost 
to build something yourself.  And that is not going to change 
until  the  stock  market  goes  up  significantly  or  bond  rates 
increase.  Banks and insurance companies are eager to lend at 
today’s going rates.  As long as bond buyers think the future is 
rosier than stock buyers, there’s going to be a lot of deals’.
173  
Indeed, in 2006 private equity firms bought 654 companies for a 
record $375 billion, 18 times the level in 2003.
174     
 
*    *  * 
 
Since public-to-private LBOs financed by cheap debt were a key 
element of the 1980s merger wave, there are obvious potential 
parallels  between  circumstances  then  and  circumstances  now.  
On the other hand, there is little resemblance between the current 
wave of buyout activity and the merger waves of 1897-1903, the 
1920s and the 1990s.  Parallels have been drawn between the 
conglomerates that rose to prominence in the 1960s and private 
equity today, but there are also notable distinctions between the 
two.  The next part of the paper considers the match between the 
two  in  more  detail,  arguing  that,  despite  various  significant 
differences between private equity firms and conglomerates there 
are sufficient similarities to suggest examining the rise and fall of 
the  conglomerates  can  provide  insights  concerning  private 
equity. 
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III.  Conglomerates and Private Equity 
 
A.  Conglomerates After the 1960s 
 
If,  as  some  have  speculated,  private  equity  firms  are  today’s 
version of the conglomerate, the prognosis for private equity is 
gloomy.  1968 provided the first hint of problems when Litton 
Industries, a ‘first-generation’ conglomerate that ranked 40
th in 
the 1969 Fortune 500 list, announced its first earnings decrease in 
14 years.  This was a major shock to investors who placed great 
emphasis on earnings per share and price/earnings ratios when 
valuing  shares.
175    The  launch  of  Congressional  hearings 
investigating the alleged adverse impact of conglomerates and an 
announcement  by  Attorney  General  Richard  McLaren  that  the 
Justice Department’s Antitrust Division intended to crack down 
on  mergers  carried  out  by  the  conglomerates  added  to  the 
downward pressure on conglomerate stock prices.
176   
 
The New York Times, within six months of a 1968 article hailing 
the ‘Time of the Conglomerate’,
177 was reporting the prices of 
leading conglomerate stocks had fallen 40% to 60% from their 
1968 highs, as compared with a general 10% decline in the stock 
market.
178  The slide continued, with the percentage drop in stock 
prices  among  32  representative  conglomerates  being  81% 
between  1968  and  1970.
179    The  1970  bankruptcy  of  Penn 
Central, a railway company which had diversified into pipelines, 
hotels,  industrial  parks  and  commercial  real  estate,  dissipated 
whatever  euphoria  had  been  associated  with  the  rise  of  the 
conglomerate in the 1960s.
180 
 
Despite the fall from the giddy heights of the late 1960s, during 
the  1970s  conglomerates  were  becoming  part  of  the  fabric  of 
U.S.  business.    Forbes  magazine  suggested  in  1976  that 
‘Conglomerates  are  no  longer  the  scarlet  women  of  America.  
Many of them are quite respectable matrons.’
181  Merger activity   29
overall  was  much  less  robust  in  the  1970s  than  it  was  in  the 
1960s,  but  with  the  deals  struck,  diversification  remained  a 
common  theme.    According  to  F.T.C.  data,  the  percentage  of 
mergers  that  involved  companies  that  were  unrelated  in  the 
products they produced and distributed actually rose from 33.2% 
in 1963-72 to 49.2% in 1973-77.
182  
  
On the other hand, formerly high-flying conglomerates generally 
limped through the 1970s.
183  By 1971, Gulf & Western, a first 
generation conglomerate ranking 69
th on the 1969 Fortune 500 
list, had already committed itself to a retrenchment program, with 
the chief executive proclaiming that divisions that didn’t perform 
would soon be sold.
184  Litton Industries began cleaning house, 
closing  down  and  selling  inefficient  divisions  so  as  to  fortify 
well-performing  subsidiaries.
185    Harold  Geneen,  generally 
acknowledged  during  the  late  1960s  to  be  the  greatest 
businessman of his time,
186 was forced to step down in 1972 as 
head  of  International  Telephone  and  Telegraph  (ITT),  a 
conglomerate ranked 11
th in the 1969 Fortune 500 rankings, amid 
allegations the company had made improper political donations 
to  secure  favorable  antitrust  treatment.
187    More  generally, 
executives  were  acknowledging  at  least  some  diversification 
mistakes;  during  the  mid-1970s,  about  half  of  U.S.  M&A 
transactions were divestitures of subsidiaries, up from just over 
10% in the late 1960s.
188   
 
Pressures on conglomerates intensified in the 1980s.  Beginning 
with Tom Waters and Robert Waterman’s 1982 book In Search 
of Excellence, management theorists urged executives to ‘stick to 
their knitting’, saying the most successful companies focused on 
particular industries and prospered by improving their knowledge 
and skills in the areas they knew best.
189  Moreover, due in large 
part  to  the  financing  possibilities  created  by  the  rise  of  junk 
bonds,  even  very  large  conglomerates  became  vulnerable  to 
unwelcome takeover bids.
190  Ronald Perelman’s successful $1.8   30
billion hostile takeover of Revlon, a cosmetics company that had 
diversified into health products, pharmaceuticals and eye care, 
illustrated the point.
191  Revlon was not an isolated case, since 
among companies in the Fortune 500 in 1980 those which were 
conglomerates were substantially more likely to be taken over 
than corporations that focused on a single line of business.
192   
Faced  with  the  threat  of  a  takeover,  executives  of  diversified 
firms  adopted  ‘value-based  planning’  to  evaluate  the 
performance  of  divisions  in  the  same  economic  terms  as  the 
stock market (e.g. using financial tools of discounted cash flow 
and hurdle rates) and to take whatever actions were necessary to 
improve the stock price.
193  As a result, large diversified U.S. 
companies  carried  out  a  wave  of  ‘financial  restructuring’  and 
‘deconglomeration’.
194  In 1985 alone, ITT announced plans to 
sell $1.7 billion in assets, Textron sold off units representing one-
third  of  its  sales,  oil  company  Mobil  spun  off  retailer 
Montgomery  Ward,  Westinghouse  indicated  it  would  sell  its 
cable television business, Gulf & Western sold its consumer and 
industrial products group and General Mills sold off its toy and 
fashion businesses to focus on consumer foods and restaurants.
195   
 
The  LBOs  carried  out  by  the  1980s  predecessors  to  today’s 
private  equity  firms  contributed  much  to  the  ‘back  to  basics’ 
movement in American industry.
196  KKR’s 1985 acquisition and 
reorganization  of  Beatrice,  which  owned  Avis,  Tropicana, 
Playtex,  Samsonite  and  numerous  other  well-known  food  and 
consumer products, stands out as one example, but there were 
numerous others.
197 A study of 32 ‘public-to-private’ deals with 
pre-buyout  equity  values  exceeding  $500  million  carried  out 
between  1983  and  1989  found  nine  of  the  targets  were 
conglomerates (i.e. the firm engaged in three or more unrelated 
lines of business) and nine others engaged in two unrelated lines 
of business.
198  By the end of 1991, each of these 18 companies 
had experienced divestiture activity, resulting in 34 divestments, 
leading the authors of the study to conclude a major theme with   31
buyout  activity  occurring  in  the  1980s  was  refocusing  the 
strategic activities of firms towards their core business.  Of the 
18 buyouts, 14 were orchestrated by what would now be referred 
to as private equity firms.    
 
Conglomerates  have  yet  to  come  back  into  fashion.    A  2004 
retrospective  of  ‘management  hooey’  by  Fortune  magazine 
dismissed  conglomeration  as  ‘stupid’.
199    A  partner  at  Bain,  a 
management  consultancy,  declared  in  2007  that  ‘The 
conglomerates  are  dead.    With  some  rare  exceptions,  the 
conglomerates’  business  model  belongs  to  the  past  and  is 
unlikely to reappear.’
200   
 
Nevertheless, the conglomerate has not vanished.  Currently the 
best  known  is  General  Electric  (GE),  which  placed  7
th  in  the 
Fortune 500 in 2006 and is a serial buyer of companies with 230 
people  working  full-time  in  its  acquisitions  team.
201    Other 
notable conglomerates include United Technologies, ranked 43
rd 
on  the  2006  Fortune  500  list  (owning  businesses  covering  air 
conditioning,  elevators,  fuel  cells,  jet  engines  and  fire  and 
security),
202  Archer-Daniels-Midland,  ranked  56
th  (food, 
beverages  and  animal  feed),
203  and  Textron,  the  conglomerate 
pioneer, ranked 170
th (aviation, defense, financial services, tools 
and turf care).
204   
 
B.  Similarities Between Conglomerates and Private Equity  
 
Conglomerates – particularly those from the 1960s -- and today’s 
private equity firms resemble each other in a number of ways.  
The nature of M&A activity is one similarity.  Conglomerates in 
their  heyday  bought  up  dozens  of  firms  and  leading  private 
equity firms do the same nowadays; Blackstone carried out 158 
buyouts  on  its  own  between  2000  and  2006.
205        Also, 
conglomerates,  as  with  private  equity  firms  today,  usually 
acquired a 100% stake in companies they targeted, meaning that   32




Another  similarity  is  a  high  level  of  unrelated  diversification.  
Private equity firms, particularly larger ones, buy up companies 
in  a  wide  range  of  often  unrelated  industries.
207    Acquisitive 
1960s conglomerates did likewise.  A 1972 article from Time 
magazine illustrates, with its characterization of ITT focusing on 
an  aggrieved  consumer  who  wanted  to  boycott  the  company, 
saying the consumer ‘could not rent an Avis car, buy a Levitt 
house, sleep in a Sheraton hotel, park in an APCOA garage, use 
Scott’s fertilizer or seed, eat Wonder Bread or Morton’s frozen 
foods…he  could  not  have  watched  any  televised  reports  of 
President Nixon’s visit to China…he would have to refuse listing 
in Who’s Who; ITT owns that too.’
208  ITT was by no means 
exceptional.    A  1969  study  testing  levels  of  diversification 
achieved by 27 mutual funds and conglomerates found that of the 
10 that were most diversified four were conglomerates.
209  
 
The ‘hands off’ head office is an additional feature shared by the 
acquisitive conglomerates of the 1960s and today’s private equity 
firms.  The general partners of a private equity firm leave the 
running  of  portfolio  companies  to  the  executives  appointed  to 
manage the individual companies and instead focus on offering 
advice and technical support.
210  Similarly, while conglomerate 
acquirers  did  seek  to  exercise  financial  control  over  the 
businesses they acquired, the parent company generally left the 
basic structure of purchased businesses unchanged, retained the 
incumbent management team and left operational decisions to the 
executives responsible for running particular divisions.
211  This 
‘hands-off’ approach indeed was something of a badge of honor.  
Signal  Companies,  a  conglomerate  ranked  68
th  on  the  1969 
Fortune 500 list, proclaimed in 1968 advertising:  ‘We told our 
companies  to  mind  their  own  business.    And  they  smiled.    33
Because  our  corporate  philosophy  is  like  a  declaration  of 
independence for every one of the Signal Companies.’
212  
 
The fact that currently conglomerates and private equity firms 
quite often sell business units back and forth illustrates further 
the overlap between these two forms of business organization.  
One of the exit options private equity relies upon is the trade sale, 
and  public  companies  operating  as  conglomerates  constitute 
obvious  potential  buyers.
213    Conversely,  diversified  industrial 
groups welcome private equity as potential purchasers for non-
core  or  underperforming  units,  particularly  since  selling  to  a 
private equity firm can avoid the personal and industrial rivalries 
a  sale  to  another  public  company  can  generate.
214    Jeffery 
Immelt, chief executive of GE, drew attention forcefully to the 
liquidity  private  equity  offers  in  a  2006  speech  to  investors: 
‘Today, there is infinite capital.  That wasn’t true five years ago, 
wasn’t true 10 years ago, and may not be true five years from 
now.  But today you can literally sell any business you have at 
the drop of a hat’.
215   
 
The  history  of  Onex  Corporation,  a  publicly  quoted  Canadian 
company, indicates in a different way the similarities between 
conglomerates and private equity.  Between the mid-1980s and 
2004,  Onex  operated  as  a  conglomerate,  specializing  in  the 
taking over and restructuring of companies.  In 2004, it changed 
its  method  of  doing  business,  opting  to  buy  up  companies 
through the medium of private equity funds it created rather than 
doing  so  directly.
216    Currently  Onex  is  Canada’s  one  major 
global player in private equity,
217 forming part of the consortium 
that  offered  $9  billion  in  2006  to  purchase  Australian  airline 
Qantas and buying up Kodak’s health-care imaging division in 
2007 for $2.55 billion.
218  
  
Credibility  in  academic  circles  is  another  feature  shared  by 
private equity and conglomerates, at least during their heyday.    34
As  early  as  1990,  a  clear  consensus  was  forming  among 
academics  who  studied  leveraged  buyouts  from  an  economic 
perspective that the carrying out of such transactions involved a 
distinctive  set  of  business  arrangements  with  the  potential  to 
correct long-standing problems of corporate governance.
219  Two 
decades  earlier,  various  academics  were  similarly  ready  to 
account for the rise of the conglomerates in terms of economic 
theory.    Some  economists,  including  the  distinguished  Oliver 
Williamson,  suggested  the  diversified  enterprise  could  operate 
beneficially  as  an  internal  capital  market  by  allocating  capital 
more  swiftly  and  adeptly  among  divisions  than  the  market 
could.
220  Another rationale proffered was that the conglomerate 
firm, by owning companies engaged in a wide range of activities, 
benefited  due  to  a  reduction  in  overall  exposure  to  business 
risk.
221    A  related argument  was  that  conglomerates  were less 
likely  to  default  due  to  cyclical  and  market  fluctuations  than 
companies operating in a single line of business and thus could 
borrow more cheaply.
222   
 
Academic  opinion  admittedly  did  soon  turn  forcefully  against 
conglomerates.    A  1977  survey  of  empirical  studies  on 
conglomerate  mergers  said  the  evidence  was  ‘surprisingly 
consistent’, showing ‘the mergers (managers) have consummated 
have  on  average  not  generated  extra  profits  for  the  acquiring 
firms  (and)  have  not  resulted  in  increased  economic 
efficiency.’
223    It  soon  became  almost  axiomatic  among 
researchers in finance and strategy that corporate diversification 
was value reducing.
224  Conglomerate mergers were explained as 
a manifestation of the agency cost problem that afflicts public 
companies,  with  managers  of  the  acquisitive  conglomerates 
wanting to run bigger companies to enhance their own status and 
perks and focusing on targets in unrelated industries to reduce 
their own firm-specific risk and avoid strict antitrust enforcement 
against horizontal and vertical mergers.
225   
   35
A  capacity  for  capturing  the  public  imagination  constitutes  a 
further link between conglomerates in their heyday and private 
equity now.  In the same way ‘You can’t pick up the paper or 
turn on the TV and not hear about (private equity)’ now,
226 the 
conglomerates  fascinated  observers.    As  the  author  of  a  1971 
book on conglomerates said ‘Everybody loves a winner.  Nothing 
succeeds  like  success.    These  and  similar  adages  describe 
fittingly  the  merger-conglomerate  story  during  the  1960s’.
227  
Endorsements came from various quarters.  The chief executive 
of  conglomerate  Bangor  Punta,  which  originated  from  a  tiny 
railroad company and a failing sugar company and was by 1969 
ranked number 326 on the Fortune 500 list, predicted in 1969 
that by the end of the 1970s there would be only 200 independent 
corporations in the U.S., all conglomerates.
228  The New York 
Times  observed  in  a  1968  feature  on  conglomerates  ‘An 
enchantment  with  innovation  embraces  all  facets  of 
contemporary  society….Computers  and  lasers,  organ 
transplantation and space exploration foreshadow radical changes 
in the basis of physical life, while in business the revolution is 
heralded by the rise of the conglomerate….’
229  An investment 
research service was quoted in the Wall Street Journal the same 
year as describing Gulf & Western as ‘the prototype of what the 
American corporation of the future is all about’.
230   
 
Investor enthusiasm constitutes an additional similarity between 
conglomerates  and  private  equity.    Private  equity  firms  are 
currently  raising  ever-larger  mega-billion  $  buyout  funds, 
tapping robust investor demand for this form of investment and 
prompting  concerns  of  a  ‘bubble’  in  the  sector.
231    Investors 
similarly were  enthusiastic  backers  of  the  1960s  conglomerate 
movement.    Stock  market  indices  generally  rose  through  the 
1960s  and  touched  historic  highs  on  a  number  of  occasions 
between  1965  and  1968  and  conglomerates  outperformed  the 
stock market as merger activity peaked.
232  Using 1965 as the 
base (= 100), Moody’s Industrials as a general measure of stock   36
market  behavior  and  a  price  index  composed  of  ten 
conglomerates, as of 1967 the Moody’s index was 102 and the 
conglomerate index was 167.4 and as of 1968 the figures were 
111.1 and 179.1.
233   
 
Market  sentiment  soon  reversed  quickly.    The  conglomerate 
index fell to 141.0 in 1969 and to 89.9 in 1970 before recovering 
somewhat to 111.9 in 1971, compared with 110.2 in 1969, 95.3 
in 1970 and 112.1 in 1971 for the Moody’s index.  A 2001 study 
comparing  market  valuations  of  36  highly  acquisitive 
conglomerates  matched  with  stand-alone  firms  confirms  the 
swing  in  investor  sentiment,  finding  a  statistically  significant 
conglomerate  ‘premium’  between  1966  and  1968  and  a 
statistically  significant  discount  between  1972-74.
234    One 
interpretation of this finding is that investors in the late 1960s 
were simply mistaken about the benefits of conglomerates, but it 
is  also  possible  the  internal  capital  markets  conglomerates 
provided offered advantages in the 1960s that disappeared in the 
1970s as external capital markets became more competitive.
235 
 
Political  controversy  constitutes  a  final  parallel  between  the 
conglomerates  of  the  1960s  and  private  equity  today.    Noted 
management  professor  Jeffrey  Garten  has  summarized  the 
current  position  of  private  equity  neatly  as  follows:    ‘Private 
equity firms have been accused of asset stripping in Europe and 
anti-competitive activity in the  US, with additional charges of 
improper  tax  treatment  of  partners’  incomes  now  arising  in 
Washington.’
236    Conglomerates  were  similarly  controversial.  
Criticism of them was shrill at times, motivated by concerns that 
a  concentration  of  economic  power  was  occurring  without 
federal  regulations  to  prevent  it.
237    S.E.C.  chairman  Manuel 
Cohen  called  the  rise  of  the  conglomerate  ‘one  of  the  very 
serious problems that is facing the American industrial capital 
structure’
238  and  as  Part  IV  will  describe  concern  about   37
conglomerates  helped  to  prompt  changes  to  accounting  rules, 
securities regulation and tax law.  
 
C.  Conglomerates and Private Equity:  The Differences  
 
Though there are numerous similarities between conglomerates 
and private equity firms, they differ in ways that suggest private 
equity  may  avoid  the  same  fate.    One  distinction  is  that 
conglomerates  take  direct  ownership  stakes  in  the  companies 
they acquire whereas private equity firms establish independent 
funds  organized  as  limited  partnerships  to  carry  out  buyouts.  
Since  the  investment  funds  private  equity  firms  establish 
typically have a fixed duration of ten years, a private equity firm 
has to put the cash to work as soon as it is feasible to do so and 
has  to  be  purposeful  when  buying  and  restructuring 
companies.
239    In  contrast,  while  conglomerates  did  divest  to 
some  degree  in  the  1970s  and  1980,  they  are  by  reputation 
reluctant  sellers,  refraining  from  divesting  business  units  that 
satisfy  rudimentary  corporate  performance  benchmarks.
240  
Private equity, with a model based on the need to restructure a 
business over a finite period typically should provide a clearer 
basis  for  action  than  the  ‘last  year’s  earnings  plus  x%’  target 
diversified publicly quoted companies often use.
241   
 
Another distinction between private equity and conglomerates is 
that  the  latter  offers  greater  scope  for  counterproductive 
meddling  by  the  ‘head  office’.    With  private  equity,  each 
investment fund that is established has a different set of limited 
partners,  which  makes  it  difficult  for  ‘headquarters’  to  ‘play 
favorites’ between its various portfolio companies or orchestrate 
any intermingling of activities.  Moreover, with each investment 
fund,  covenants  in  the  partnership  agreement  will  ensure  that 
cash  flows  paid  by  the  operating  units  must  be  distributed  in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, rather than being 
available for the general partners to allocate as they see fit among   38
portfolio companies.
242  Market forces also impose a significant 
constraint, since a private equity firm that develops a reputation 
for  over-centralizing  management,  cross-subsidizing  between 
portfolio  companies  or  inappropriately  favoring  one  portfolio 
company at the expense of others will find it more difficult to 
close  public-to-private  deals  since  managers  will  opt  to  work 
with a rival with a reputation for a more hands-off approach.
243   
 
Similar organizational constraints are absent in conglomerates.  
While the conglomerates that came to prominence in the 1960s 
typically  sought  to  give  their  operating  divisions  substantial 
autonomy, the philosophy soon began to change.  By the early 
1970s, parent companies were switching from ‘conglomerating’ 
to managing, as reflected by the fact subsidiaries became more 
closely identified with their parent companies, such as Paramount 
Pictures  being  explicitly  affiliated  with  Gulf  &  Western  and 
Levitt & Sons with ITT.
244  Intermingling of activities in turn 
became a temptation whenever top management took the view 
that  one  operation  could  productively  support  another  through 
cross-subsidies  or  inter-firm  sales.    For  instance,  when  ITT 
owned Avis, ITT employees and suppliers were ‘encouraged’ to 
rent Avis when possible.
245   
 
Even when conglomerate parents restricted their activities to the 
allocation  of  capital  among  operating  divisions,  there  was 
considerable  potential  for  them  to  get  things  wrong.    For  a 
conglomerate to operate as an effective internal capital market, 
headquarters should increase investment in stronger divisions and 
put weaker divisions on a diet.
246  Conglomerates in fact often do 
not do this.  If a conglomerate parent operates in a ‘core’ industry 
despite  diversification,  subsidiaries  outside  that  industry  often 
find it difficult to lobby successfully for additional investment, 
regardless of the merits of their proposals.
247  More generally, the 
head office cannot be fully confident the managers of its various 
subsidiaries will provide accurate and honest information, since   39
the executives will lobby on behalf of their own business and 
have  little  incentive  to  sacrifice  for  the  larger  benefit  of  the 
conglomerate.    Lord  Weinstock,  who  orchestrated  a  complex 
merger of Britain’s leading engineering firms in the late 1960s, 
put the point bluntly saying ‘All managers are liars.  It’s just a 
question  of  how  big  the  lies  are.’
248    As  a  result,  in  a 
conglomerate  critical  capital  allocation  decisions  can  end  up 
being made by head office executives struggling to keep up with 
numerous businesses and operating with much less than perfect 
information.
249    The  problem  is  compounded  because  parent 
companies exhibit a general bias in favor of relatively ‘weak’ 
lines of business, perhaps because managers of weaker divisions 
work  harder  at  campaigning  for  increased  resource  allocations 
because  the  opportunity  cost  of  taking  time  away  from 
productive work to engage in rent-seeking lobbying is lower.
250   
 
An  additional  difference  between  private  equity  and 
conglomerates  is  that  the  executives  running  companies  under 
control of private equity should be more strongly motivated than 
their  counterparts  managing  divisions  within  a  conglomerate.  
Again, in private equity buyouts the managers of the portfolio 
companies take up a substantial percentage of the shares of the 
companies they run and know, due to the limited life of the fund 
owning the company, that an unbiased valuation event is in the 
offing that could make them rich if all goes well.
251  In contrast, 
since  a  conglomerate  typically  owns  all  of  the  shares  in  the 
companies it buys, the managers of its businesses will not own 
equity in the divisions they run.  Performance-oriented incentives 
thus  are  generally  limited  to  bonuses  based  on  a  subsidiary 
meeting  or  exceeding  prescribed  economic  and  financial 
benchmarks, such as revenue growth, return on investment and 
accounting  earnings.
252    Since  divisional  executives  have  only 
limited  opportunities  to  benefit  from  performing  well, 
conglomerates are prone to losing talented managers tempted by 
the opportunity to take the helm at their own more specialized   40
companies.
253    At  present,  private  equity  is  where  they  often 
choose to go.  For instance, in 2006, the private equity owners of 
VNU, a Dutch media group, recruited as chief executive the head 
of the largest division of GE, with the potential payback being 
$100 million.
254  According to press reports, ‘a legion of senior 
executives…has followed suit.’
255    
 
With private equity the incentive structure of those operating at 
‘head office’ level is also likely to be more robust than is the case 
with conglomerates.  The partners in a private equity firm who 
act as the general partners for the funds it launches have only a 
tiny ownership stake in the funds themselves, but stand to benefit 
considerably if all goes well due to entitlement to a substantial 
percentage of a fund’s profits in the form of ‘carried interest’.
256  
For senior executives in a conglomerate, to the extent that their 
pay  is  linked  to  performance,  the  measuring  stick  will  be  the 
conglomerate’s overall performance, rather than the performance 
of  particular  divisions.    As  a  result,  they  only  have  a  direct 
financial  incentive  to  worry  about  the  performance  of 
subsidiaries  when  matters  deteriorate  to  the  point  where  the 
parent company’s share price begins to suffer markedly.  More 
generally,  due  to  well-known  collective  action  problems  in 
widely held companies, even if sub-optimal performance across 
divisions  means  a  conglomerate  is  consistently  failing  to 
maximize share  value, a prompt executive response cannot be 
taken for granted.  Executives running conglomerates are clearly 
not  immune  from  market  pressures,  as  evidenced  by  the 
divestitures carried out from the 1970s onwards.  Nevertheless, 
senior executives in the parent company of a conglomerate are 
less likely to be responsive to sub-optimal performance than their 
counterparts in a private equity firm.   
 
D.  Private Equity’s Potential Deficiencies 
    41
Economists George Baker and George David Smith in a 1998 
book on KKR acknowledged likenesses between conglomerates 
and LBO associations but concluded the latter ‘was of another 
breed altogether.’
257  It likely indeed is true that private equity 
firms  address  better  a  series  of  deficiencies  that  afflict  the 
conglomerate.    However,  private  equity  also  has  its 
shortcomings, meaning that a path to ever-greater prominence is 
not economically  pre-ordained.   Hence,  market  and  regulatory 
contingencies  will  do  much  to  govern  the  future  trajectory  of 
private equity. 
 
Even private equity’s advocates acknowledge the business model 
is  potentially  subject  to  strain.    Michael  Jensen,  in  the  1989 
article where he claimed the rise of the LBO association could 
precipitate  the  eclipse  of  the  public  corporation,  warned  of 
‘worrisome structural issues’ and ‘limitations on the size of this 
new  organizational  form’,  citing  a  tendency  to  take  more 
compensation in the form of front-end fees than back-end profits 
and a temptation to reconfigure operating divisions as acquisition 
vehicles.
258    More  generally,  Jensen  cautioned  ‘As  LBO 
associations  expand,  they  run  the  risk  of  recreating  the 
bureaucratic waste of the diversified public corporation.’
259   
 
The spread of bureaucracy could indeed be a threat to private 
equity.
260  The larger private equity firms are sprawling world-
wide  empires,  with  numerous  companies  in  diverse  industrial 
sectors  operating  under  their  control.    Partners  in  these  firms 
have powerful financial incentives, in the form of carried interest, 
to  keep  a  firm  grip  on  what  is  happening  with  the  various 
investment  partnerships  they  have  launched.    Nevertheless,  as 
private  equity  firms  operate  a  growing  number  of  investment 
partnerships, the disparity between the ‘stars’ and the ‘duds’ is 
likely to grow, which in turn could prompt potentially corrosive 
disagreements about how to share returns among partners.   
   42
Fees constitute another organizationally-related concern arising 
from the growth or private equity.  Since the management fee 
general  partners  charge  limited  partners  applies  to  all  money 
committed  rather  than  funds  actually  deployed,  all  else  being 
equal, private equity firms have a strong incentive to continue to 
set  up  ever-larger  investment  funds.
261    One  might  anticipate, 
however,  that  private  equity  firms  would  be  cutting  the 
management fee percentage for their megafunds since a private 
equity firm running a $10 billion fund does not spend 10 times as 
much to rent and heat its offices as it does when it runs a $1 
billion  fund.
262    Nevertheless,  there  has  thus  far  been  little 
downward movement, which means that private equity partners 
who are in charge of the megafunds are earning huge sums even 
if they do not deliver superior risk-adjusted returns.
263  So long as 
private  equity  buyout  funds  generally  yield  good  results, 
investors will likely continue to back private equity despite the 
fees  charged.    However,  if  the  current  benign  conditions  for 
private  equity  buyouts  change,  the  fee  structure  could  soon 
become a strong deterrent to future fund-raising.   
 
Another  way  in  which  organizational  discipline  could  break 
down is that private equity firms will begin to carry out an ever 
growing  proportion  of  ill-advised  deals.    This  was  a  serious 
problem for conglomerates in the 1960s, as evidenced by what a 
leading ‘conglomerator’, speaking anonymously to the author of 
a 1971 book on conglomerates, said of errors made by his peers 
(and himself): 
 
‘The  trouble  is  that  they  began  to  listen  to  their 
public relations, that the only direction was up, that 
you can go from one acquisition to another without 
stopping, not worrying about the equity that remains 
and letting the long-term debt pile up.   You talk to a 
roomful  of  (investment)  analysts  and  see  their 
tongues hanging out, waiting the big projection, and   43
you give it to them.  We are optimists by nature, and 
if  they  invite  us  to  ‘optimize’,  well,  dammit,  we 
‘optimize’.  Then what happens to us?  We pile up 
long-term  debt,  we  over-project  our  earnings,  we 
build  up high  hopes  for  our  operating people  and 
they let us down – and then it all shows up in the 
earnings.    The  analysts  start  puking  all  over  the 
place,  they  catch  hell  from  the  institutions  and 
suddenly conglomerates are no good.’
264    
 
Partners  in  private  equity  firms  traditionally  have  not  had  to 
worry about what investment analysts have to say, since neither 
the investment funds they establish nor the firms themselves are 
publicly quoted.  Nevertheless, the limited life of the investment 
funds private equity firms establish puts pressure on the general 
partners to deploy the capital promptly, a task that is becoming 
ever  more  challenging  since  private  equity  firms  are 
accumulating  ever  larger  pools  of  capital  to  invest.    The 
combination  of  numerous  private  equity  firms  with  cash  to 
spend,  and  spend  quickly,  could  foster  competition  among 
potential buyers that jacks up prices and prompt deals of dubious 
merit.
265    To  illustrate,  private  equity  firms  used  to  shy  away 
from buyouts in highly cyclical sectors since they feared being 
forced to sell out during an industry slump.
266  However, they are 
now  prepared  to  take  private  companies  operating  in 
unpredictable industries such as airlines and semiconductors.
267   
 
An additional concern is that private equity firms, cognizant they 
are establishing new and larger funds they must manage, could 
feel under increasing pressure to wind up existing funds hastily, 
and  in  so  doing  arrange  exits  that  do  not  maximize  investor 
return.  Returns to investors from IPOs involving firms that were 
under the umbrella of private equity seem to confirm the pattern.  
‘Reverse  buyouts’  private  equity  firms  orchestrated  between 
1980 and 2002 outperformed the stock market for a number of   44
years  after  the  IPO.
268    On  the  other  hand,  during  2006  IPOs 
private  equity  firms  arranged  performed  far  worse  than  the 
overall market and other companies going public.
269  A plausible 
interpretation of this trend is that the firms, being eager to create 
exits,  are  losing  their  touch  with  public  offerings,  depressing 
returns accordingly.   
 
‘Club deals’, where private equity firms form consortia to carry 
out  large  buyouts,  also  imply  a  potential  breakdown  of 
organizational discipline.  A virtue of conventional private equity 
arrangements is directness of control, with general partners from 
the private equity firm motivated by ‘carried interest’ to keep a 
close watch on the managers of the portfolio companies to ensure 
all is proceeding according to plan.  Once a consortium replaces 
a single private equity buyer, the lines of responsibility can break 
down, as managers have to answer to several private equity firms 
rather  than  just  one.
270    Matters  are  likely  to  be  particularly 
problematic if things do not go according to plan and the private 
equity firms have a difference of opinion on how to turn things 
around.
271   
 
Drawing  matters  together,  private  equity  firms  do  differ  in 
significant ways from conglomerates, and likely are better able to 
cope with the challenges associated with controlling numerous 
companies  operating  in  diverse  industries.    Nevertheless,  the 
private equity model has shortcomings of its own.  As a result, 
private equity’s  future trajectory will be contingent to  at least 
some degree upon market conditions and regulatory constraints.  
Given this, and given that conglomerates and private equity firms 
share various features in common, analysis of the causes of the 
sharp reversal conglomerates suffered in the late 1960s and early 
1970s provides insights on where private equity is likely to go 
from here.  The next part of the paper correspondingly draws 
upon  the  conglomerate  experience  and  the  LBO  boom  of  the   45
1980s to identify contingencies that could undermine the private 
equity’s seemingly inexorable rise.    
 
IV.  Contingencies  that  Could  Precipitate  the  Eclipse  of 
Private Equity 
 
Public-to-private transactions are unlikely to disappear.  There 
inevitably will be some publicly quoted companies that will be 
better off operating outside the stock market limelight, at least 
temporarily,  and  so  long  as  the  benefits  associated  with 
orchestrating conversions to the private realm exceed the costs, 
there will be at least some third-party financiers ready to take the 
lead.    Nevertheless,  various  general  factors  will  govern  how 
much scope there is to profit from deals of this sort.  This part of 
the  paper  canvasses  these,  drawing  upon  evidence  from  past 
waves  of  acquisition  activity  resembling  the  current  surge  in 
private equity buyouts to provide guidance on how the balance 
might tip away from private equity in the future.   
 
A.  Stock Prices  
 
It is a well-established empirical fact that takeover activity varies 
with  the  level  of  the  stock  market,  with  takeover  booms 
coinciding  with  rising  stock  prices.
272    The  current  wave  of 
private  equity  buyout  activity  has  generally  coincided  with 
buoyant stock prices,
273 but the stock market experienced some 
significant  price  declines  in  the  early  months  of  2007.    Past 
trends  seem  to  imply  therefore  imply  a  sustained  bear  market 
would undercut private equity buyouts.  In fact, given history and 
the structure of private equity currently, other factors are more 
likely to precipitate a decline in buyout activity.   
 
With  the  conglomerates,  at  first  glance  events  corroborate  a 
nexus between share prices and takeover activity.  Stock prices of 
conglomerates  rose  substantially  during  the  late  1960s  as  the   46
merger wave they led peaked.  Matters reversed dramatically in 
1969 and 1970, with stock prices falling significantly and M&A 
activity  dropping  off  dramatically.
274    Many  observers  have 
inferred  cause  and  effect  from  this,  such  as  noted  economists 
Andrei  Shleifer  and  Robert  Vishny,  who  have  said  ‘the 
conglomerate  merger  wave  of  the  1960s  is  the  case  of 
prototypical acquisitions by the more overvalued firms of the less 
overvalued ones for stock.’
275  The assumption being made is that 
conglomerates, as publicly quoted companies, used their shares 
as  currency  for  takeovers  and  with  their  shares  trading  at  a 
premium, they were ideally situated to structure bids at prices 
shareholders of target companies would accept.  Then, when bad 
news occurred, the conglomerates lost their premium rating and 
accordingly their ability to make successful bids.
276  
 
This interpretation of events likely exaggerates the importance of 
the stock market.  There were indeed major conglomerates that 
offered payment in the form of shares.
277  On the other hand, 
while until the mid-1960s most conglomerate acquisitions were 
financed  by  the  exchange  of  equity,  in  the  latter  half  of  the 
decade cash tender offers became the norm as investors in the 
public  companies  that  became  targets  preferred  the  certainties 
associated  with  cash  or  debt  to  hard-to-value  conglomerate 
shares.
278  Given this change in pattern, the stock market reversal 
occurring in  1969  and  1970  likely  did  not  derail  the  wave  of 
conglomerate mergers, at least single-handedly.   
 
The rise and fall of the leveraged buyout in the 1980s similarly 
shows that with going private deals, fluctuations in share prices 
do not necessarily dictate their pace.  After rising sharply through 
the 1980s, stock markets dipped sharply in 1987.
279  The stock 
market reversal did little  to deter the growth of the leveraged 
buyout  market,  with  the  number  of  public-company  buyouts 
actually  increasing  from  47  in  1987  to  125  in  1988,  and  the 
average  value  of  the  deals  going  up  from  $466.7  million  to   47
$487.7 (in 1988 dollars).
280  The iconic RJR Nabisco deal was 
finalized in 1989, and the wave of LBO deals only came to an 
end as the year drew to a close, two years after the 1987 stock 
market crash.   
 
The  manner  in  which  private  equity  buyouts  are  currently 
structured confirms stock market fluctuations are unlikely to be a 
prime  determinant  of  future  buyout  activity.    Consistent  with 
Shleifer and Vishny’s interpretation of the events in the 1960s, 
current theoretical work on merger waves that seeks to explain 
why merger waves occur during bull markets focus on the ability 
of companies carrying out acquisitions to take advantage of their 
highly valued shares to buy up targets.
281  Assuming this is a 
correct diagnosis, the pattern should not repeat itself with private 
equity since shareholders of the target companies are paid in cash 
provided  by  the  private  equity  fund  carrying  out  the  buyout, 
combined with debt finance.  
 
This  does  not  mean  the  stock  market  is  irrelevant  to  private 
equity  buyouts.    The  outsize  returns  private  equity  investors 
anticipate are contingent upon the portfolio companies being sold 
on advantageous terms and initial public offerings are a primary 
exit strategy, evidenced by the fact in 2006 almost half of the 
nearly 160 initial public offerings in the U.S. involved ‘reverse 
buyouts’ of companies emerging from private equity.
282  IPOs are 
particularly important with large companies, since with a trade 
sale  or  ‘secondary  buyout’  by  another  private  equity  firm 
typically one buyer must be found to pay the entire price whereas 
with a public offering only a portion of the equity will be made 
available for sale, at least initially.
283  Also, private equity firms 
seek to play their respective exit markets off each other, and if an 
IPO  is  a  realistic  option,  they  should  be  able  to  secure  better 
deals from trade or private equity buyers.
284  Since IPOs will be 
easier to carry out on advantageous terms if stock markets are   48
buoyant, private equity firms can use a rising stock market as a 
selling point when raising capital for their buyout funds.   
 
At the same time, rising stock prices can also be bad news for 
private equity buyouts.  Shareholders in a target company will 
not sell their shares unless they are offered a premium above the 
prevailing  stock  market  price,  so  in  a  rising  stock  market  the 
price benchmark for successful deals will, on average, be higher.  
Also, private equity firms are more likely to end up in expensive 
bidding contests since public companies will be better positioned 
to  mount  competitive  bids  using  their  highly  priced  shares  as 
currency.    Thus,  in  buoyant  market  conditions,  private  equity 
firms seeking to acquire public companies to take private will 
need  to  pay  more  to  make  successful  bids,  implying,  all  else 
being equal, returns to investors will fall.
285  Conversely, a stock 
market dip can act as a catalyst for investment in private equity 
since investors will be eager to explore alternative investments 
and since the fall in prices can improve returns private equity 
firms generate by making targets cheaper.
286  Hence, even if the 
share price declines in the early months of 2007 constitute the 
beginning of a sustained downward trend, private equity buyout 
activity would not necessarily suffer markedly.
287  
 
B.  Debt Markets   
 
Debt  is  an  integral  element  of  private  equity  buyouts,  serving 
both as a crucial means of finance and as a ‘stick’ motivating 
managers  of  portfolio  companies.
288    As  the  co-founder  of 
Carlyle Group said in 2007, ‘Cheap debt is the rocket fuel.  We 
try to get as much as we can as cheaply as we can and as flexibly 
as  we  can’.
289    With  debt  being  both  cheap  and  plentiful 
currently, the environment is ideal for private equity firms to do 
precisely this.
290   
   49
It cannot be taken for granted the current benign conditions will 
continue.    Rising  interest  rates,  major  financial  shocks  and  a 
string  of  big  defaults  could  rapidly  dissipate  the  liquidity  that 
currently characterizes debt markets.
291  Optimists maintain the 
private  equity  industry  can  ride  out  an  adverse  credit  cycle.  
When  asked  about  ‘cheap  money’  in  a  2007  newspaper 
interview, a senior partner in Permira, a leading European private 
equity firm, said ‘We have seen probably at least three cycles in 
the private equity business…We fundamentally believe it’s all 
about building strong, sustainable and competitive businesses.’
292 
 
This likely is too sanguine a point of view.  In the event of a 
financial downturn, balance sheets for portfolio companies that 
can  currently  be  characterized  as  examples  of  efficient 
deployment of debt could prove to be wildly over-leveraged.
293  
A  prolonged  recession  would  then  prompt  numerous  defaults, 
restructurings  and  insolvencies.
294    The  returns  generated  by 
private  equity  funds  would  suffer  in  turn,  which  would  likely 
constrain  future  fund-raising.
295    Moreover,  with  the  funds 
private equity firms were able to raise, they would no longer be 
able to rely on cheap debt to increase their financial firepower, 
which could in turn cause buyouts to slow to a crawl.
296  Bearing 
such considerations in mind, three Wall Street Journal columnists 
suggested  at  the  beginning  of  2007  ‘When  a  credit  crunch 
arrives, those who most loudly promote private equity could be 
heading for the thrift store’.
297   
 
Market turbulence in the early months of 2007 provides a hint of 
what may happen.  Stock market prices fell significantly around 
the  world,  prompting  investors  to  step  back  from  riskier 
investments.  Prices for high-yield debt in turn tumbled, eliciting 
predictions  that  rising  interest  rates  for  junk  bonds  might 
undercut  significantly  the  momentum  for  public-to-private 
buyouts.
298 
   50
There are historical precedents for this sort of reversal.  Since 
investors  in  public  companies  targeted  for  acquisition  by 
conglomerates  often  were  apprehensive  about  share-for-share 
exchanges, the conglomerates frequently had to depend on debt 
to get deals done.
299  One option was to borrow to raise cash to 
offer  to  target  shareholders.    For  instance,  an  unsecured  $84 
million loan from Chase Manhattan Bank in 1965 financed Gulf 




Another option, particularly popular during the intense flurry of 
conglomerate mergers in the late 1960s, was for a conglomerate 
to  offer  ‘other  securities’  (sometimes  referred  to  derisively  as 
‘funny money’, ‘confetti’ or ‘Chinese paper’) to shareholders of 
the  target  company.
301    These  could  be  straight  debentures 
(unsecured bonds) issued by the conglomerate or ‘convertible’ 
debentures giving the target shareholders the option to buy the 
acquiring company’s shares under prescribed circumstances.
302   
 
Conglomerates’ balance sheets reflected the use of debt to carry 
out acquisitions as firms that carried out conglomerate mergers 
were  more  highly  leveraged  than  other  industrial  firms  and 
became more highly leveraged as the 1960s progressed.
303   
When price inflation accelerated in the U.S. in the late 1960s, 
investors fearful of the impact the changing market conditions 
would  have  on  the  riskiness  of  corporate  debt  punished  the 
conglomerates, as bonds issued by a sample of conglomerates 
fell 45.6% in value between the end of 1968 and mid-1970 while 
the Dow Jones Industrial Bond average fell only 7.8% over the 
same  period.
304    Issuing  fresh  debt  on  acceptable  terms  thus 
became  very  difficult  for  an  acquisitive  conglomerate.    The 
decline  in  share  prices  compounded  the  effect  since  with 
convertible debt the option to buy shares lost much of its appeal.  
The bear market also deterred those already holding convertible 
debt  from  buying  shares,  meaning  many  conglomerates  faced   51
higher than anticipated interest costs going forward.
305  To cap 
matters off, the rise in interest rates accompanying the double-
digit inflation that characterized the 1970s hampered the ability 
of  any  acquisition-minded  conglomerate  to  carry  out  debt-
financed deals.
306   
 
The dramatic decline in public-to-private buyouts in the U.S. in 
the  wake  of  the  1980s  merger  boom  provides  even  clearer 
evidence  that  a  reversal  of  the  current  benign  credit  market 
conditions  would  derail  private  equity’s  current  rise  to 
prominence.  When junk bond financing became freely available 
in 1985, this created a ‘demand push’ that caused buyouts to be 
structured  more  aggressively  and  to  be  more  susceptible  to 
financial distress.
307  In 1989 the deterioration of favorable debt 
conditions exposed the fragile aspects of the deals.
308  Defaults 
by  companies  servicing  high-yield  debt  increased  as  they 
struggled to cope with a nascent economic recession.  As junk 
bond  investors  became  aware  of  the  pick  up  in  defaults  they 
pulled  their  money  out  of  the  market  at  a  rate  of  billions  of 
dollars a month and began demanding a huge risk premium to 
buy high-yield debt.  As a result, the spread of junk bond yields 
over Treasury bond yields rose from 4% or 5% in the late 1980s 
to 7% in 1990 before peaking at 12% at the beginning of 1991.
309   
 
The supply of credit from ‘senior’ lenders contracted at the same 
time, as bank loans in support of buyouts fell 86% between 1989 
and 1990.
310  The impact on public-to-private deals was dramatic, 
as Bruce Wasserstein, an ‘acknowledged grandmaster’ of deals 
during the 1980s merger wave, has described:
311 
 
‘For  a  time,  the  credit  markets  were  almost 
nonexistent.  Banks were extremely hesitant when it 
came making any new loans.  The market for new 
junk  bond  issuances  dried  up  almost  completely.  
Even the secondary market for junk bonds almost   52
disappeared.    The  financial  buyers  (private  equity 
firms)  were  particularly  vulnerable  to  the  credit 
crunch that ensued, as capital was the oxygen that 
gave  life  to  the  leveraged  acquisition  structure.  




The Economist observed in 1991 that ‘(f)ar from being relics of 
the 1980s, raiders, LBOs and junk bonds will almost certainly 
return as soon as the American and British economies revive.’
313  
The  prediction  ultimately  proved  accurate,  but  the  revival  of 
high-yield debt and going private deals was not just around the 
corner.    By  1994  banks  who  suffered  losses  when  the  1980s 
merger boom ended were prepared again to provide financing for 
takeovers but  they strongly preferred to  loan  money to public 
companies rather than buyout specialists.
314  As for junk bonds, 
while during the late 1980s approximately $20 billion of high 
yield debt was raised per year for acquisition purposes, it was not 
until 1997 that this figure was matched and exceeded.
315  Not 
coincidentally,  going  private  deals  remained  in  the  doldrums 
until the end of the 1990s.
316  Even as late as 2000, an investment 
banker  was  quoted  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal  as  saying  that 
because bond markets were tighter than in the 1980s, ‘we will 
see  more  LBOs,  but  I  don’t  think  you’ll  see  RJR-type 
situations.’
317    Events  occurring  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  thus 
confirm  that  a  prolonged  credit  crunch  would  likely  undercut 
substantially private equity’s recent dramatic growth. 
 
C.  Fewer Suitable Targets   
 
For private equity firms, their ability to deliver returns that justify 
their sizeable fees hinges to a significant degree on their ability to 
buy  companies  at  prices  low  enough  to  leave  ample  scope  to 
generate profits by orchestrating a successful turnaround.  Private 
equity firms correspondingly are eager not to become involved in   53
expensive  auctions  with  competing  bidders.    The  standard 
technique a private equity firm uses to prevent such an outcome 
is to work in tandem with senior executives of the target, since 
this will give the private equity buyer an advantage large enough 
to  discourage  potential  rival  bids  and  leave  dispersed 
shareholders too disorganized to mount opposition to a ‘low-ball’ 
offer.
318  The available evidence suggests that during the current 
wave of buyouts private equity firms have indeed been able to 
buy companies at reasonable prices.  A study of 50 private equity 
buyouts between October 2005 and December 2006 found buyers 
paid, on average, only 6% more than the seller’s highest stock 
market price during the previous year.
319   
 
If  conditions  change  and  prices  for  buyout  targets  increase 
significantly,  private  equity  firms  conceivably  might  cut  back 
their fund raising, surmising that they will be unable to carry out 
deals  that  are  sufficiently  profitable  to  deliver  the  results 
investors expect.  Such prudence cannot be taken  for granted, 
however, since the management fees private equity firms charge 
provide  them  with  a  strong  financial  incentive  to  create  ever 
larger buyout funds.  Given this, and given that the limited life of 
buyout funds means cash that is raised must be deployed and 
deployed fairly promptly, private equity firms could increasingly 
end up paying unjustified premiums to buy companies, eroding 
returns  substantially  and  ultimately  undermining  investor 
confidence in the sector.
320   
 
One catalyst for overpayment by private equity firms could be 
that their efforts to achieve a significant ‘first mover’ advantage 
fail to achieve the desired effect and they end up in expensive 
bidding  contests.    For  instance,  with  Blackstone  Group’s  $39 
billion  buyout  (including  debt)  of  Equity  Office  Properties,  a 
competing bid from Vornado Realty, a public company, likely 
pushed up the price by several billion dollars.
321  Even where 
there  is  no  competing  bidder,  ‘pushback’  by  directors  and   54
shareholders could drive prices  up.   For instance, in  the U.K. 
private equity has experienced something of a ‘seller’s strike’, 
with growing reluctance on the part of boards and shareholders to 
accept terms offered by private equity firms resulting in the value 
of withdrawn or failed bids being nearly five times the value of 
completed deals in 2006.
322  
 
Until 2007 there had not been a similar challenge to a big U.S. 
public-private  deal.
323    However,  2007  began  with  a  going 
private backlash, with independent director resistance forcing the 
founder of Swift Transportation to pay a 31% premium to take 
the company private and with major institutional shareholders in 
Clear  Channel  Broadcasting,  the  country’s  largest  radio 
broadcaster, indicating they would not accept an $18.7 billion bid 
by  two  private  equity  firms  and  the  company’s  founding 
family.
324    A  partner  in  an  investment  fund  owning  shares  in 
Clear  Channel  said  the  response  by  shareholders  showed  the 
‘market  has  decided  it  won’t  sell  listed  equity  to  insiders  at 
discounted prices.’
325   
 
The historical evidence confirms there is a danger that private 
equity firms will begin to overpay for companies, with adverse 
consequences.  Conglomerates buying up companies during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s were fairly conservative with their 
acquisition strategies, opting to buy smaller companies available 
at bargain prices.
326  There were targets available because there 
were many private companies where owners were looking for a 
quicker exit than the stock market provided and various older 
public companies languishing with low stock prices but decent 
assets.
327  As Royal Little, chief executive of Textron during the 
1950s  when  it  began  the  conglomerate  fad,  said  in  a  1985 
interview:  ‘When I was building up Textron 30 years ago, you 
could buy a company at eight times its annual earnings.  Today 
you may have to pay 15 times earnings.  I could not create a   55




Matters  began  to  change  as  the  conglomerate  merger  wave 
moved into high gear in the mid and late-1960s, as decent targets 
at decent prices became harder to find.
329  While throughout the 
1960s a large proportion of mergers involved the acquisition of 
smaller companies, conglomerates began to seek out ever-larger 
prey, with the average size of acquisitions carried out by large 
conglomerates increasing from $9.6 million between 1960 and 
1965 to $23.7 million in 1966-67 and $84.5 million in 1968.
330  
Also, the focus shifted from underperforming companies where a 
conglomerate  could  anticipate  quick  efficiency  gains  through 
restructuring to targets with profits above the average for their 
industries.
331    Even  with  poorly  performing  companies,  the 
conglomerates were not guaranteed any sort of bargain, as they 
increasingly had to mount potentially expensive hostile takeover 
bids to capture control.
332    
 
The pattern repeated itself with the 1980s merger wave.  Due to 
rising stock markets and increased competition for deals, as the 
decade drew to a close LBO associations found it increasingly 
difficult to find under-priced companies to buy.
333  The statistical 
evidence illustrates the point, with the mean price for corporate 
acquisitions of $500 million or more rising from 8.5 times annual 
earnings before interest and taxes in 1980 to 13.2 in 1985 and 
16.6  by  1989.
334    Prices  in  contested  takeovers  became 
particularly  steep,  with  premiums  over  pre-bid  share  prices 
averaging  80%.
335    While  a  number  of  the  more  conservative 
buyout firms did little business in 1987 and 1988, believing the 
deals  on  offer  were  overpriced  and  risky,
336  consistent  with 
general trends prices in public-to-private deals rose significantly 
relative to fundamentals (e.g. net cash flow) in the second half of 
the 1980s.
337  As law professor Louis Lowenstein has put it ‘The 
prices being paid for companies were so high that the buyer was   56
frequently losing money from the beginning.’
338  The specter of 
returns being eroded by overpayment, compounded by acquired 
companies  struggling  to  cope  with  large  debt  burdens  at  the 
beginning of a recession, do much to explain why financing for 
buyout funds largely dried up as the 1990s began.
339  If prices of 
target companies in fact do increase markedly during the current 
private equity boom, the process could yet repeat itself.   
 
D.  Regulatory Changes   
 
The regulatory environment constitutes a final variable that could 
cause the current private equity boom to stall or go into reverse.  
Even  those  who  argue  that  private  equity  firms  are  in  the 
ascendancy because of fundamental failings by public markets to 
allocate  capital  efficiently  acknowledge  increased  regulation 
could  bring  to  an  end  the  halcyon  days  of  private  equity.
340  
Again history is instructive.  As with private equity today, the 
1960s conglomerate merger wave in the U.S. and the leveraged 
buyout  boom  in  the  U.S.  in  the  1980s  were  politically 
controversial  and  in  both  eras  regulatory  changes  occurred 
designed to put a brake on acquisition activity.  Establishing a 
causal link between the introduction of new regulation and the 
decline in M&A activity is difficult because in both eras market 
conditions deteriorated at much the same time.
341  Nevertheless, 
even if reform was not the primary reason conglomerate mergers 
and public-to-private LBOs were sidelined, politics’ significance 
should not be underestimated.  In both the 1960s and 1980s, if a 
market-driven  reversal  had  not  occurred,  more  thoroughgoing 
and  ambitious  political  reform  than  actually  took  place  might 
well have achieved the same outcome.
342  With private equity, 
even if market conditions remain favorable, the introduction of 
regulations designed to address its perceived excesses could yet 
bring the current boom to an end.     
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1. Conglomerate Mergers 
With the 1960s conglomerate merger wave, antitrust enforcement 
is  often  cited  as  a  variable  that  initially  fostered  and  then 
subsequently deterred acquisition activity.  The Celler-Kefauver 
Act of 1950 amended a provision in the 1914 Clayton Act that 
prohibited  mergers  that  substantially  lessened  competition  to 
ensure  asset  sales  were  covered  in  addition  to  share-for-share 
exchanges.
343    A  series  of  U.S.  Supreme  Court  decisions 
followed  indicating  any  large  firm  intent  on  expanding  by 
horizontal  or  vertical  merger  faced  significant  antitrust 
hazards.
344    On  the  other  hand,  well  into  the  1960s,  both  the 
courts and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department took 
the view that conglomerate mergers could only be attacked under 
the  Clayton  Act’s  anti-merger  provisions  under  special 
circumstances.
345    At  least  some  executives  of  acquisition-
minded companies chose targets accordingly,
346 and many cite 
the orientation of antitrust policy as a catalyst for conglomerate 
mergers,  with  a  1984  history  of  conglomerates  saying  ‘the 
Celler-Kefauver Act may be considered the Magna Charta (sic) 
of the conglomerate movement.’
347   
 
In  1968  the  antitrust  outlook  became  much  cloudier  for 
conglomerates.    Antitrust  enforcers  in  the  Justice  Department 
issued  guidelines  indicating  that  any  acquisition  of  a  large 
company by an already large diversified company violated the 
Clayton Act if the transaction restricted ‘potential competition’, 
gave  the  purchaser  a  ‘decisive  competitive  advantage’  or 
promoted ‘reciprocity’, in the sense the purchaser obliged one of 
its divisions to buy or sell from another division without offering 
equal access to competitors.
348  In 1969, the Antitrust Division 
launched five conglomerate merger ‘test’ cases, including three 
involving ITT.
349  The Antitrust Division generally fared badly in 
the  courts  with  these  proceedings  and  by  1971,  the  Antitrust 
Division’s enthusiasm for conglomerate merger enforcement had 
dimmed.
350      Nevertheless,  from  1968  onwards  conglomerates   58
contemplating  a  merger  could  not  ignore  the  possibility  of  a 
costly  and  potentially  successful  antitrust  challenge.    The 
resulting uncertainty likely acted as a deterrent to conglomerate 
deals.
351   
 
Tax  reform  also  may  well  have  played  a  role  in  halting 
conglomerate mergers.  As the merger wave peaked in the late 
1960s,  conglomerates  were  commonly  using  convertible 
debentures they issued as acquisition currency.
352  Under tax law, 
interest payments corporations are obliged to make generally can 
be  deducted  in  calculating  taxable  income,  whereas  dividend 
payments  cannot.    This  asymmetry  creates  an  opportunity  for 
companies to increase earnings  through increased  use of debt, 
which  means  tax  law  subsidizes  debt-financed  acquisitions.
353  
As a result, during the conglomerate era, financing acquisitions 
through  the  use  of  convertible  debt  was  a  tax-advantageous 
strategy.  Also, shareholders in target companies concerned about 
tax liability welcomed payment in convertible debentures since 
capital gains liability was deferred until the debenture was sold 
or converted to shares.
354  In 1969, however, amendments to tax 
law targeted convertible debentures, curtailing opportunities for 
the deferral of capital gains liability and disallowing the interest 
deduction when a company paid interest of more than $5 million 
annually on this form of debt security.
355  Given the popularity of 
convertible  debentures  as  acquisition  currency,  these  changes 
likely worked in tandem with changing market conditions to put 
a debt-related brake on the conglomerate merger wave.
356  
 
Securities law reform may also have been a contributing factor.  
As acquisitive conglomerates turned their attention increasingly 
from privately held companies to public companies in the mid-
1960s, their bid tactics could be highly aggressive.  For instance, 
Gulf & Western’s preferred strategy was to reduce the overall 
cost  of  making  a  bid  by  secretly  establishing  a  ‘beachhead’ 
equity  position  in  a  potential  target  by  buying  shares  at  the   59
prevailing  market  price  before  the  stock  price  jump  that 
inevitably coincided with the announcement of a takeover bid.
357   
 
Techniques  such  as  Gulf  &  Western’s  were  possible  because 
neither federal securities nor state corporate law regulated tender 
offers.
358  In 1968, however, Congress enacted the Williams Act, 
which  made  it  more  difficult  for  prospective  bidders  to  profit 
from  establishing  a  ‘beachhead’  by  requiring  any  person 
acquiring 10% or more (reduced to 5% in 1970) of a company’s 
outstanding  shares  to  declare  this  publicly  by  filing  with  the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.
359  The Act also obliged a 
bidder  to  make  available  to  shareholders  of  a  target  material 
information concerning the bid and keep the tender offer open for 
at least 20 business days.  This eliminated use of the ‘Saturday 
night  special’,  an  aggressive  tactic  adopted  by  some  bidders, 
including conglomerates, that involved making a surprise offer 
over the weekend to prevent a response by the target managers 
until  part  of  a  ‘short  fuse’  offer  period  had  expired.
360    The 
Williams Act, with these and other changes to the law concerning 
takeovers, made it more expensive for acquisitive companies – 
including  conglomerates  –  to  make  takeover  bids,  with  the 
average control premium paid in takeovers rising from 32% prior 
to the adoption of the Act to 53% between 1968 and 1977.
361  
  
Accounting reform also may have helped to deter conglomerate 
mergers.
362    During  their  heyday,  the  conglomerates  had 
considerable latitude to choose between two accounting methods 
when  dealing  with  corporate  acquisitions,  the  ‘pooling  of 
interests’ and ‘purchase’ methods.
363  Whereas with the purchase 
method assets of the target company were accounted for at their 
market value, with pooling, which was the more popular of the 
two,  assets  of  the  target  company  were  recorded  at  their  pre-
merger  book  value  (i.e.  the  historical  cost  when  the  target 
initially acquired them).
364  Acquirers typically paid considerably 
more for the assets than the book value and when this occurred   60
the difference was debited to the acquirer’s stockholders’ equity 
account, which created the opportunity for the company to boost 
its earnings when it sold the assets.
365  For example, if Company 
A bought Company B for $40 million, Company B had assets 
that  originally  cost  $15  million  and  Company  A  later  sold 
Company  B  for  $35  million,  Company  A  could  report  a  $20 
million profit even though there was a net loss of $5 million.
366  
A  congressional  study  found  that  if  ITT  had  used  purchase 
accounting, its earnings between 1964 and 1968 would have been 
40%  lower  than  reported.
367    Even  the  purchase  method  was 
subject to potential abuse because when a company paid higher 
than market value for assets it acquired, it did not have charge the 
differential against its ‘bottom line’ annual earnings figure but 
could simply record it on its accounts as goodwill.
368   
 
In 1970 the Accounting Principles Board, then the standard setter 
for GAAP, issued two opinions designed to close these merger 
acquisition  loopholes.    One  required  that  a  series  of  highly 
technical  conditions  be  satisfied  for  a  merger  to  qualify  for 
pooling-of-interest accounting and the other stipulated ‘goodwill’ 
created  by  a  merger  could  no  longer  be  excluded  from  the 
‘bottom  line’  and  instead  had  to  be  systematically  written  off 
against future earnings for a period not to exceed 40 years.
369  
Many  executives  and  investment  bankers  predicted  the 
accounting  changes  would  sharply  curtail  the  1960s 
conglomerate merger wave.
370  Care must be taken in judging 
this  assessment.    The  acquisition  binge  by  conglomerates  had 
largely  ended  by  the  time  the  accounting  reforms  were 
introduced.    Creative  acquisition  accounting  may  not  have 
generated much of a pay-off for conglomerates, since even prior 
to  the  reforms  diligent  investors  probably  could  have  ‘seen 
through’ the accounting data and determined sustainable earnings 
for themselves.
371  Finally, as mentioned, it is unclear whether 
share prices were in fact a key determinant of acquisition activity 
by  conglomerates.    Despite  these  caveats,  it  remains  likely   61
accounting reform constituted something of a check on any sort 
of major revival of conglomerate building.
372  
 
2. 1980s LBOs 
During the late 1980s, the political spotlight fell on leveraged 
buyouts as part of a larger public policy debate generated by the 
economic  upheavals  arising  from  mergers  and  corporate 
restructurings.
373    Congressional  hearings  generated  reams  of 
testimony  and  some  ambitious  legislative  proposals.
374    For 
instance,  the  chairman  of  the  House  Subcommittee  on 
Telecommunications and Finance unveiled a bill that would have 
tightened considerably the takeover bid procedure requirements 
initially mandated by the Williams Act, would have required a 
‘community impact’ statement to assess the damage a takeover 
might cause to affected communities and would have required 
bidders to have firm financing in place before they announced a 
deal.
375  The general uncertainty created by the prospect of this 
sort  of  legislation  likely  delayed  deals  that  were  never 
consummated due to the adverse market conditions of the early 
1990s.
376   
 
Aside  from  proposals  that  did  not  make  their  way  on  to  the 
statute  book,  a  number  of  reforms  did  occur  at  the  state  and 
federal level as a result of concerns about takeover activity that 
plausibly might have deterred buyouts by LBO associations.  An 
unlikely  contender  is  the  set  of  anti-takeover  laws  enacted  by 
numerous  states  that  gave  boards  and  current  shareholders 
additional  latitude  to  fend  off  unwelcome  takeover  offers.
377  
Studies  seeking  to  establish  whether  this  legislation  in  fact 
deterred  hostile  takeover  offers  have  yielded  mixed  results.
378  
Even if the changes to the law did help to deter hostile bids, it is 
unlikely they did much to derail the buyouts organized by LBO 
associations since such firms had a strong preference for friendly 
deals.   
   62
1989 amendments  to  federal  tax  law  aimed  at  junk  bonds,  an 
important  source  of  buyout  finance  from  1985  onwards,  were 
likely  of  greater  significance.    One  change  made  was  that 
companies raising finance by issuing high-yield debt securities 
that  provided  for  deferred  interest  payments  could  only  take 
advantage of the tax deduction when the interest was actually 
paid  rather  than  when  the  debt  was  incurred.
379    Moreover, 
interest rate deductions were eliminated entirely for high-yield 
‘payment in kind’ bonds, these being debt securities where the 
interest took the form of additional debt owing from the issuer to 
the holder rather than cash payments.
380  It has been estimated on 
the basis of transactions carried out between 1987 and 1989 that 
the  1989  tax  changes  would  have  claimed  3%  to  5%  of 
transaction value, suggesting that the tax changes were not ‘deal 
killers’  but  would  have  reduced appreciably  investor  return  in 
buyouts financed by junk bonds.
381 
 
Junk bonds were targeted from another direction, namely legal 
reforms  affecting  the  savings  and  loan  (S&L)  industry,  which 
was in crisis by the end of the 1980s.  Congress responded by 
enacting in 1989 the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA).
382  The Act prohibited savings and 
loan institutions from holding bonds that were not of investment 
grade and obliged S&Ls to divest all high-yield debt instruments 
as quickly could prudently be done.
383  This not only cut off what 
had been an important source of demand for high-yield bonds but 
also  meant  owners  of  billions  of  dollars  worth  of  junk  bonds 
were under an onus to unload them promptly.
384   
 
Some  attribute  the  collapse  of  the  junk  board  market  at  least 
partially to FIRREA.
385  On the other hand, S&Ls were not a 
dominant  player  in  the  junk  bond  market,  with  their  holdings 
peaking  at  8.2%  of  overall  junk  bond  debt  in  1988.
386    Also, 
various market events coincided with the enactment of FIRREA 
that  would  have  spooked  debt  investors,  such  as  the  1989   63
indictment of junk bond king Michael Milken for securities law 
violations,  the  1990  collapse  of  Robert  Campeau’s  junk-bond 
financed  takeover  of  Federated  Department  Stores,  the  1990 
closure  of  junk  bond  leaders  Drexel  Burnham  Lambert  and 
concerns  about  an  impending  recession.    As  a  result,  market 
forces  probably  did  more  than  FIRREA  to  undercut  the  junk 
bond market that helped to fuel the 1980s buyout boom.
387    
 
3. Regulation and Private Equity Today 
As occurred with conglomerates in the 1960s and LBOs in the 
1980s, the political climate for private equity is becoming chilly.  
Political  animosity  directed  at  private  equity  is  particularly 
palpable  in  Europe,  beginning  in  2005  when  a  German 
government minister equated the private equity industry with ‘a 
swarm of locusts’.
388  European trade union leaders have stepped 
up  the  attack  more  recently,  using  the  2007  World  Economic 
Forum  to  warn  private  equity  firms  they  ‘should  no  longer 
consider  themselves  untouchable’  and  to  denounce  them  for 
awarding outsized remuneration to partners and for profiting by 
‘asset stripping’ the companies they buy.
389   
 
Criticism of private equity in the U.S. has been less intense than 
in  Europe  but  the  political  temperature  is  at  least  ‘warm’ 
already.
390    For  instance,  Barney  Frank,  new  chairman  of  the 
powerful House finance committee, has announced plans to hold 
hearings  on  private  equity.
391    The  political  temperature  could 
readily  shift  to  ‘hot’  if  debt-laden  private  equity-owned 
companies,  some  of  which  are  in  politically  sensitive  sectors 
such as healthcare and energy, respond to any sort of downturn in 
the US economy with radical restructurings, including lay-offs.
392   
 
Some private equity leaders profess to be shocked they are of 
public  interest.    As  Blackstone  founder  Stephen  Schwarzman 
said at the 2007 World Economic Forum ‘I don’t understand this 
transparency  criticism  at  all  –  we  are  totally  open  to  our   64
shareholders’.
393  In terms of political tactics, this could well be a 
short-sighted attitude.  As a business columnist observed in 2007:  
‘(P)rivate  equity  managers  must  understand  that  they  have 
become too big to hide.  They must make their case before the 
bar of public opinion.  If they fail to do so, their wings will be 
clipped.  That is the price of democracy.’
394  There indeed are 
those in the private equity industry who concede there is a public 
relations problem.   A Carlyle Group partner acknowledged in 
2007  that  private  equity  firms  had  done  ‘an  awful  job’  of 
presenting themselves to the public, saying ‘We don’t talk about 
blue-collar workers’ and instead ‘brag about how much money 
we have made.’
395   
 
The  areas  where  private  equity  buyouts  are  most  likely  to 
generate  regulatory  responses  match  those  where  regulatory 
activity occurred in response to the rise of conglomerates and 
1980s LBOs.  For instance, as with the conglomerates, antitrust 
law  could  complicate  matters  for  private  equity.    As  buyouts 
become bigger, larger private equity firms can potentially find 
themselves  in  a  sufficiently  dominant  role  in  an  industry  to 
generate  a  response  from  antitrust  officials.    For  instance,  in 
2007, after Carlyle Group and Riverstone, another private equity 
firm,  participated  in  the  buyouts  of  the  two  companies  that 
dominate energy distribution markets in the southeastern U.S., 
the  Federal  Trade  Commission  ordered  the  two  private  equity 
firms  to  avoid  direct  involvement  in  one  of  the  companies.
396  
Bidding  consortia,  in  which  several  private  equity  firms  join 
forces  to  try  to  buy  large  target  companies,  are  also  under 
scrutiny.  In 2006, the Department of Justice wrote to five major 
private equity firms asking them for information as part of an 
investigation  into  whether  such  alliances  constitute  unlawful 
collusion to hold down prices being paid for companies.
397   
 
Private  equity  could  also  become  the  target  of  reforms  to 
corporate and securities law.  When private equity firms arrange   65
public-to-private deals key incumbent managers are often hired 
to run the company, typically with a potential ‘exit’ upside that 
far  exceeds  what  they  would  earn  if  the  company  stayed 
public.
398    Due  to  the  exit  lure  and  the  appeal  of  escaping 
regulatory pressures, executives of public companies might well 
be  tempted  to  solicit  private  equity  suitors  secretly  but 
actively.
399    The  potential  for  conflicts  of  interest  loom  even 
larger once a private equity firm and incumbent managers agree 
to work together on a buyout.  In this scenario, instead of trying 
to fetch the best possible deal for shareholders, the executives 
will want the price to be as low as possible to reap the maximum 
reward in the future.
400  The problem is compounded because top 
executives,  with  their  knowledge  and  influence,  can  often 
advance a favored deal to the point where potential competing 
bidders will steer clear.
401  
 
Senior executives who secretly solicit going private deals and use 
private information to tilt matters in their favor potentially breach 
duties  they  owe  to  their  company.
402    However,  assuming  a 
proposed buyout transaction is properly reviewed by a committee 
of independent directors acting on the basis of full information, a 
successful legal challenge is unlikely.  During the 1980s wave of 
leveraged buyouts proposals were made to tighten the law, such 
as requiring companies to hold an auction where management 
had  initiated  the  bidding  or  even  prohibiting  completely 
management  participation  in  buyouts.
403    In  2006  an  op-ed 
contributor to the New York Times revived the idea of banning 
management  involvement  in  buyouts,
404  and  proposals  of  this 
sort  are  likely  to  become  more  common  assuming  the  private 
equity boom continues.  If management participation in buyouts 
were in fact ever prohibited, this would sidetrack many public-to-
private  deals  since  incumbent  executives  would  have  strong 
incentives  to  oppose  bids  where  success  meant  dismissal  and 
private equity firms generally eschew hostile takeovers.  Even a 
compulsory  auction  rule  could  discourage  going  private   66
transactions, as private equity firms would know that they were 
likely to end up in bidding contests before securing control, thus 
potentially eroding returns.
405    
 
The current private equity boom could also prompt changes to 
tax law.  Given that adjustments were made to the deductibility 
of  interest  payments  in  response  both  to  the  conglomerate 
mergers  of  the  1960s  and  the  leveraged  buyout  wave  of  the 
1980s, the tax treatment of interest stands out as a logical target 
for  reform  now.    Curtailing  substantially  the  deductibility  of 
interest payments from the income of portfolio companies could 
be  a crippling  blow  for  private  equity, given  how  heavily  the 
industry relies on debt.
406  Germany could soon provide a test 
case.  The finance ministry has published a draft tax reform bill 
that,  if  enacted,  would  cap  at  a  low  level  interest  expenses 
deductible  from  income  so  long  as  a  company  is  part  of  a 
corporate  group.
407    Private  equity  firms  have  criticized  the 
proposal, saying the change would lower the return on deals in 
Germany.
408  The country’s finance minister has responded by 
saying if reform has ‘an impact on this particular sector, then so 
be it.  That’s the point.’
409   
 
If the private equity boom continues, the tax treatment of ‘carried 
interest’  received  by  the  private  equity  partners  who  run  the 
funds their firms establish also could be a target for reform.  With 
careful planning these earnings will be taxed at the prevailing 
capital gains rate of 15% rather than the top rate of income tax 
the ‘airplane rich’ normally pay.
410  Tax law divides interests in 
partnerships  into  two  categories,  capital  interests  and  profits 
interests.    When  a  partner  receives  a  capital  interest  in  a 
partnership in exchange for services, such as management fees, 
the partner has immediate taxable income on the fair value of the 
interest.  Carried interest, on the other hand, is treated as a profits 
interest, meaning creation of an entitlement to it is not a taxable 
event  and  taxation  only  occurs  at  capital  gains  rates  when  an   67
actual distribution occurs.  Since partnerships are ‘pass-through’ 
entities  for  the  purposes  of  tax  law  the  character  of  income 
determined at the entity level is preserved as it is received by the 
partners,  meaning  for  them  carried  interest  is  taxed  at  capital 
gains rates.   
 
The tax benefits of carried interest are well-known in the private 
equity industry but the  topic has received little attention from 
policymakers,  academics  or  lobby  groups.
411    This  is  now 
changing,  as  Senate  finance  committee  staffers  are  reportedly 
evaluating whether reform might be justified.
412  If lawmakers 
are minded to end the tax break private equity partners receive 
the  most  straightforward  ‘fix’  would  be  to  change  the  law  to 
deem that receipt of carried interest be taxed as income rather 
than capital gains.
413  This would be a major blow to the personal 
finances  of  top  private  equity  executives,
414  and  thus  could 
encourage them to contemplate exit, a trend, as the next Part of 
the paper describes, could transform the fundamentally private 
nature of the industry.  
 
V.  Private Equity ‘Going Public’ 
 
Privacy  has  been  an  integral  element  of  the  private  equity 
industry.  Private equity funds are established with great care to 
ensure  they  are  not  subject  to  the  disclosure  regulations  that 
govern  collective  investment  vehicles  marketed  to  private 
investors.
415    Private  equity  firms  also  rely  heavily  on  private 
information  to  finalize  bids  before  the  competition  is  aware  a 
target company is up for sale and the sort of radical corporate 
restructuring often imposed on portfolio companies is typically 
easier to manage in private.
416   
 
Given the manner in which the private equity industry operates, it 
might sound like an oxymoron for public equity to ‘go public’ 
and seek direct access to the stock market.
417  This, however, is   68
now an emerging trend and, depending on how the shift to public 
markets occurs, an important element of ‘private’ equity could 
soon be displaced.  Two ‘going public’ options stand out.  One, 
the  less  ambitious  of  the  two,  involves  a  private  equity  firm 
seeking a stock market listing for individual investment funds it 
creates  to  raise  capital  to  buy  out  companies.    The  more 
ambitious option is for a private equity firm to carry out an initial 
public  offering  of  the  firm  itself,  thus  allowing  stock  market 
investors to own equity previously held exclusively by the firm’s 
partners.  If leading private equity firms carry out IPOs then even 
if  changing  market  conditions  and  the  introduction  of  new 
regulations  do  not  undercut  the  volume  of  public-to-private 
buyouts, the private side of private equity will have been eclipsed 
in a fundamental way.    
 
Launching  public  offerings  for  individual  funds  offers  various 
potential  advantages  for  private  equity  firms.    When  the 
financing  of  a  private  equity  fund  occurs  by  way  of  a  public 
offer, the private equity firm obtains investment capital without 
having  to  take  the  time  and  trouble  to  lobby  potential 
investors.
418  The potential will exist to issue new shares, thus 
giving  prompt  and  flexible  access  to  fresh  funds.
419    Also, 
depending on how the fund is structured, the private equity firm 
can treat the cash raised as ‘permanent capital’ so that profits on 
successful deals can be reinvested in new buyouts rather than 
being distributed to investors.
420  Private equity firms who create 
publicly  traded  buyout  funds  will  have  to  make  disclosures 
concerning the fund’s investments and the management fees but 
will need to say little about the firm itself and, by listing abroad, 
can  side-step  potentially  burdensome  U.S.  securities  laws 
governing investment companies and investment advisers.
421    
 
While publicly traded private equity buyout funds offer potential 
advantages for private equity firms, they are unlikely to capture 
the imagination of the investing public.  KKR carried out the first   69
major  public  offering  of  a  private  equity  investment  fund  in 
2006, listing KKR Private Equity Investors LP on the Euronext 
exchange  in  Amsterdam.    While  due  to  strong  demand  KKR 
boosted its fundraising target from $1.5 billion to $5 billion the 
public  offering  itself  received  a  frosty  reception,  with  shares 
dropping from the offering price of $25 to $21.75 a month later 
and  continuing  to  trade  at  below  $25  per  share  thereafter.
422  
Matters got off on the wrong foot as KKR Private Equity paid 
out €70 million in advisory fees as soon as it listed, immediately 
lowering its value.
423  Investors then downgraded the shares as 
they realized that KKR Private Equity would not deploy the cash 
raised immediately but instead would, without divulging its plans 
to  investors  or  advisers,  take  time  to  find  appropriate 
investments.
424   
 
The KKR Private Equity public offering, as one financial analyst 
remarked,  ‘cast  a  shadow  across  the  space,  as  it  has  made  it 
difficult for other private equity players to follow suit however 
well intentioned and good they might be’.
425  A few months after 
the KKR Private Equity IPO, British private equity firm Doughty 
Hanson  abandoned  well-developed  plans  to  list  its  own  $1.25 
billion  fund.
426    Other  private  equity  firms  that  were 
contemplating obtaining public listings for new investment funds 
also shelved the idea.
427   
 
Private  equity  firms  are  now  shifting  their  focus  to  the  more 
ambitious  ‘going  public’  option,  namely  selling  equity  in  the 
firms themselves.
428  A February 2007 initial public offering by 
Fortress Investment Group, with about 60% of its $30 billion of 
assets under management devoted to private equity investments, 
has been the catalyst.
429  The Fortress Investment Group IPO was 
a great success, as shares closed the first day 68% higher than the 
IPO  price.
430    According  to  the  Wall  Street  Journal,  ‘The 
performance had other hedge funds and private-equity managers 
scrambling to calculators, gazing over their own potential worth   70
if they were to follow the lead of Fortress and become public.’
431  
There indeed was a quick follow up.  In March 2007, Blackstone, 
‘the king of private equity’, filed documentation with securities 
regulators in support of a planned IPO.
432  
 
There  in  fact  are  already  a  few  examples  of  publicly  quoted 
companies with significant private equity operations.  Onex, the 
Canadian  private  equity  firm  that  formerly  operated  as  a 
conglomerate, is publicly traded.
433  3i, which is listed on the 
London Stock Exchange, derives nearly 40% of its profits from 
the sort of buyouts private equity firms traditionally focus on.
434  
Goldman Sachs Private Equity Group, an arm of publicly traded 
investment  bank  Goldman  Sachs,  is  a  leading  private  equity 
player,  having  established  the  largest  ever  buyout  fund  in 
2007.
435  Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers and Merrill 
Lynch, three other large publicly quoted investment banks, also 
have significant private equity operations.
436   
 
Two factors will determine whether it will become the norm for 
elite private equity firms to join the stock market, namely the 
attitude of key partners and the willingness of investors to buy 
shares.  An IPO can only occur if a firm’s proprietors want it to, 
with  the  key  potential  motivators  being  the  raising  of  fresh 
capital and a desire to cash out, at least partially.  On both counts, 
going public could be tempting for proprietors of private equity 
firms.  A private equity firm that uses public offerings to raise 
investment capital will not have to engage as often in the time-
consuming  investment  courting  of  pension  funds,  endowments 
and wealthy families.
437  Also, the firm would have a financial 
buffer when market conditions make it difficult to raise funds, 
execute buyouts or orchestrate exits.
438  In addition, it could use 
its  equity  as  acquisition  currency;  Blackstone’s  IPO 
documentation indicated it might use its new shares to buy other 
asset management firms.
439  
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As  for  proprietors  seeking  an  exit,  depending  on  the 
demographics of the partnership, this indeed could be a powerful 
motivator.  With the Blackstone IPO, the transaction provided an 
opportunity  for  Blackstone  founders  60-year  old  Stephen 
Schwarzman and 80-year old Peter Peterson to cash out partially 
and could help to resolve succession issues by ensuring retiring 
partners  will  own  shares  they  can  sell  after  their  departure.
440  
Other leading buyout firms like KKR, Texas Pacific and Carlyle 
each have founders in their 50s and 60s who also might welcome 
the opportunity to monetize at least part of their investment and 
clarify future exit arrangements.
441  In addition, founders might 
find  a  public  offering  appealing  because  of  a  ‘legacy  effect’:  
being  public  will  help  to  institutionalize  the  business  and 
improve its chances of being around decades from now.
442   
 
Even if partners in a private equity firm want to use a public 
offering to raise capital or arrange an exit, they will be unable to 
proceed unless there is sufficient demand for the shares to meet 
the  price  expectations  of  the  owners.
443    The  success  of  the 
Fortress  IPO  shows  investors  find  the  idea  of  owning  part  of 
firms  that  specialize  in  ‘alternative  investments’  to  be 
appealing.
444    On  the  other  hand,  investor  support  for  private 
equity industry cannot be taken for granted, as investors’ frosty 
reaction to public offerings of private equity investment funds 
indicates.
445    Even  the  Fortress  IPO  is  itself  something  of  a 
cautionary tale, as within a month of the public offering the share 
price was well below the IPO day peak.
446   
 
The  Blackstone  IPO  will  be  an  important  test  of  market 
sentiment.  If it is a great success, then there could well be a race 
by other leading private equity firms to follow suit.  If it is not, 
with Blackstone being an acknowledged leader in the industry, 
other  private  equity  firms  are  unlikely  to  find  the  market 
reception to be sufficiently positive to make IPOs worthwhile.   
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Given the proclamation of Blackstone of Stephen Schwarzman 
that  ‘public  markets  are  overrated’,  the  firm’s  IPO  filing 
prompted  the  suggestion  the  firm  had  ‘had  a  conversion  of 
damascene proportions.’
447  If leading private equity firms do go 
public  this  indeed  would  be  a  significant  departure  from  the 
lucrative  business  model  that  has  transformed  Wall  Street.
448  
Carrying  out  IPOs  will  mean  that  otherwise  secretive  private 
equity firms will have to offer investors some details on their 
business operations, such as the size of partners’ pay and their 
overall rate of return.
449  More generally, scales that seemingly 
had been tipping against the public company will be balanced out 
to  a  significant  degree.    The  rise  of  private  equity,  given  the 
secretive nature of private equity firms and the public-to-private 
buyouts  they  conduct,  has  implied  to  some  the  decline  of  the 
public company.  Public offerings by private equity firms would 
constitute at least a partial correction of the trend.  Even if the 
taking  private  of  publicly  quoted  companies  remains  a 
mainstream  pursuit,  the  exercise  will  occur  largely  under  the 
umbrella of public markets.  Thus, IPOs by firms that dominate 
the private equity industry imply the eclipse of private equity, at 
least as the term has been traditionally conceived.     
 
Though  private  equity  IPOs  would  transform  the  framework 
within  which  public-to-private  buyouts  would  occur,  matters 
need to be kept in perspective.  It seems unlikely, at least in the 
short-to-medium term, the ownership structure of private equity 
firms  will  be  radically  transformed  by  public  offerings.    For 
instance, with the Fortress IPO, only 9% of the shares were sold 
to  the  public.
450    Similarly,  the  Blackstone  IPO  is  being 
structured so that only 10% of the management company will be 
sold  to the public (at a price implying the entire enterprise is 
worth $40 billion).
451  Other private equity firms that carry out 
IPOs will likely adopt the same conservative approach, ensuring 
current owners retain comfortable voting control.
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Assuming private equity firms that undertake IPOs continue to 
carry out buyouts primarily through the medium of investment 
funds they create, private equity firms that go public will also not 
simply  become  21
st  century  conglomerates.    Conglomerates 
derive  their  earnings  primarily  from  profits  generated  by  the 
underlying businesses, in the form of dividends paid or capital 
gains on sale.  In contrast, since the percentage of the equity the 
general partners own in investment funds a private equity firm 
establishes is usually tiny, private equity firms generally do not 
gain  significant  direct  benefits  from  the  companies  their 
investment funds buy.
453  Their revenues are instead generated 
primarily from fees paid by the various investment funds they 
establish, in the form of management fees and carried interest.
454  
For  a  private  equity  firm  that  goes  public  a  key  advantage 
retaining this method of investment would offer would be that 
the  firm  could  continue  to  keep  important  aspects  of  its 
operations private.  Investors would be privy to the fees it was 
generating and its overall investment record, but would probably 




Even if IPOs do not become routine for private equity firms there 
is  another  way  in  which  private  equity  could  move  under  the 
public umbrella.  For owners of a privately held firm who are 
seeking  to  exit,  a  public  offering  is  not  the  only  exit  option.  
Another possibility is for the business to be sold outright to a 
buyer.  If the proprietors of a private equity firm sell out to a 
publicly  quoted  company,  then  as  with  a  public  offering,  the 
‘private’ element of the business will have been displaced in an 
important way.   
 
Which public companies might look to acquire a private equity 
firm?  If we were in the 1960s, conglomerates would be obvious 
candidates,  but  it  seems  unlikely  that  their  present  day 
counterparts are ambitious enough to take on the challenge.  A   74
more likely possibility is a private equity firm that has already 
carried out an IPO.  Blackstone’s IPO documentation indicated 
that it may use its shares to buy other asset management firms.
456  
Publicly quoted investment banks are another possibility, since 
they  should  have  experience  accommodating  highly  paid, 
independent-minded, overachieving employees under a corporate 
umbrella.  A market leader such as Blackstone, at a price of $40 
billion  or  more,  would  be  too  big  a  target.
457    Moreover, 
investment  banks  that  already  have  large  private  equity 
operations,  as  Goldman  Sachs  and  Merrill  Lynch  already  do, 
might well opt to continue to build from the inside rather than 
grow by acquisition.  However, for investment banks lacking a 
significant market presence in private equity but seeking to build 
one  up,  purchasing  a  successful,  well-run  second-tier  private 
equity firm might well be a worthwhile short cut.   
 
VI.   Conclusion 
 
There has been in the past few years a flight of corporations from 
public markets.  Privately held private equity partnerships have 
been buying out and taking private more companies and bigger 
companies  than  ever  before.    If  private  equity’s  rise  to 
prominence  continues  unabated,  then,  as  Michael  Jensen 
predicted  back  in  1989,  we  could  conceivably  witness  the 
‘eclipse of the public corporation.’  This would be a fundamental 
transformation, since the public company has dominated the U.S. 
economy for decades.   
 
We predict that despite the seemingly inexorable rise of private 
equity,  matters  will  work  out  differently  than  current  trends 
imply.  One possibility is that the private equity industry could 
suffer the same fate as the conglomerate, namely a reversal of 
dramatic growth followed by partial retreat.  The experience with 
conglomerates is instructive since 1960s conglomerates, as with 
leading private equity firms today, bought and ran large numbers   75
of  companies  in  diverse  industries,  developed  an  enthusiastic 
following  among  investors,  were  characterized  as  capitalist 
trend-setters and were politically controversial.  Various factors 
contributed to the decline of the conglomerates, namely falling 
share prices, a deteriorating market for corporate debt, a decline 
in the number of suitable targets to buy and regulatory changes.  
As we have described, similar contingencies, with the possible 
exception  of  share  prices,  could  come  into  play  with  private 
equity  and  disrupt  a  benign  environment  for  private  equity’s 
growth.     
  
Private  equity  differs  in  key  respects  from  the  conglomerate.  
While  private  equity  firms  and  conglomerates  both  bring  a 
diverse  collection  of  businesses  under  the  same  organizational 
umbrella,  private  equity  firms  should  do  better  at  hiring  and 
retaining good managers and at creating the right mix of carrots 
and sticks for those managers.  Also, private equity firms should 
offer  more  robust  incentives  to  those  in  ‘headquarters’, 
exemplified  by  sizeable  performance  fees  and  requirements  to 
sell businesses due to the fixed duration of the investment funds 
they operate.  The organizational advantages of  private equity 
suggest that even if underlying conditions become unfavorable, 
private equity will do a better job of riding out the storm than did 
the conglomerates.  After all, what were known in the 1980s as 
LBO associations were forced to the sidelines but ultimately re-
emerged stronger than ever as private equity firms.   
 
While  private  equity  might  well  be  more  robust  than  the 
conglomerate, we nevertheless predict at least a partial private 
equity eclipse.  Just as Jensen was predicting the eclipse of the 
public corporation, a combination of deteriorating debt markets, 
a  dearth  of  suitably  priced  targets  and  regulatory  changes  put 
public-to-private  buyout  activity  in  a  ‘deep  freeze’  that  lasted 
more than a decade.  The pattern could repeat itself with private 
equity.  Currently, the environment for private equity buyouts is   76
close to optimal.  Stock markets are buoyant enough to provide 
an exit option, debt is both cheap and plentiful, targets have been 
available at reasonable prices and regulation has done little to 
deter  public-to-private  buyouts.    Conditions  could,  however, 
change rapidly.  Market turbulence could foster a drop in stock 
prices  and  a  credit  crunch.    ‘Pushback’  by  directors  and 
shareholders could drive up the prices  of buyout targets.  For 
private equity, a prolonged period in the political limelight could 
result in an unfavorable regulatory terrain for public-to-private 
buyouts.  A combination of these adverse circumstances might 
well marginalize private equity in the same way as occurred in 
the 1990s.   
 
Even if conditions remain favorable to private equity, its eclipse 
is likely to occur in a different way.  Privacy has been a hallmark 
of private equity, with industry leaders being dismissive of public 
markets  and  with  the  leading  firms  operating  as  secretive 
partnerships that strive to negotiate buyouts behind closed doors 
and restructure portfolio companies outside the public gaze.  A 
major shift in a public direction could be imminent, however.  
Assuming  market  conditions  remain  sufficiently  favorable  for 
private equity firms to carry out IPOs on terms senior partners 
find acceptable, most leading private equity firms could soon be 
publicly  quoted.    Going  public  offers  various  potential 
attractions,  including  permitting  founders  to  monetize  at  least 
part  of  their  investment  and  providing  a  better  foundation  for 
continuity in future decades.  If today’s leading private equity 
firms do indeed carry out IPOs, then even if the taking private of 
publicly  quoted  companies  remains  a  mainstream  pursuit, 
consistent with historical pre-eminence of the public company in 
U.S., the exercise will occur largely under the umbrella of public 
markets.   
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